Fordham Law Review
Volume 79

Issue 5

Article 10

November 2011

Extracting Compassion from Confusion: Sentencing Noncitizens
After United States v. Booker
Francesca Brody

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Francesca Brody, Extracting Compassion from Confusion: Sentencing Noncitizens After United States v.
Booker, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2129 (2011).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol79/iss5/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

NOTES
EXTRACTING COMPASSION FROM CONFUSION:
SENTENCING NONCITIZENS
AFTER UNITED STATES V. BOOKER
Francesca Brody*
A noncitizen facing a federal judge for sentencing confronts a
demonstrably different future than an otherwise identical citizen.
Deportation, immigration detention, harsher prison conditions, and a
longer actual sentence may all await the noncitizen federal inmate. The
U.S. Courts of Appeals have disagreed as to whether a district judge can
consider those consequences in crafting a sentence under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines.
This Note argues that the circuit split results from circuit courts’ varying
appellate scrutiny of sentencing decisions after United States v. Booker. To
resolve the split, this Note encourages the U.S. Sentencing Commission to
adopt an amendment to the Guidelines, thereby promoting uniformity
among sentencing courts. As an alternative, this Note argues that it is
proper for sentencing courts to consider alienage under 18 U.S.C. § 3553.
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INTRODUCTION
Noe Ferreria was a thirty-nine year old permanent resident of the United
States, having emigrated from Mexico at age fifteen.1 Gainfully employed
as a truck driver and a “devoted father,” Ferreria lived with his five
children, all U.S. citizens, and their mother, his companion of over a
1. See United States v. Ferreria, 239 F. Supp. 2d 849, 851 (E.D. Wis. 2002).
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decade. 2 He entered the United States legally and had never before been
convicted of a crime. 3 Despite his twenty-five year history in the United
States, when Ferreria pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine,4 his
residency status subjected him to near certain deportation to Mexico at the
conclusion of his prison sentence. 5 Thus, in addition to the primary
consequences of his conviction, Ferreria stood likely to be “kicked out” 6 of
the country that had become his home, “lose his family,” 7 and be forced to
return to a nation where he had not lived since childhood. 8
Federal courts have disagreed as to whether these and other immigration
consequences of a criminal conviction should be offset by a downward
departure or variance from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines)
recommendation. In United States v. Ferreria, the court found that the
“extraordinary hardship” of deportation merited a downward departure from
the sentence recommended by the Guidelines.9 In so holding, Ferreria
followed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 10 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,11 and several district courts, 12 all of which
permit consideration of immigration consequences in sentencing, but
aligned against a bloc led by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, which counsels against such consideration in most—if not all—
circumstances. 13
In creating the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Commission) and shaping
the Guidelines, Congress was driven by the desire to increase uniformity in
sentencing 14 and “secure nationwide consistency.” 15 Thus, when courts
diverge in their recognition of a basis for variance, the central purpose of
the Guidelines is stymied. Noncitizens make up forty-seven percent of
defendants in federal court,16 and many will face deportation.17 The

2. Id. at 855.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 849.
5. See id. at 851; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (rendering deportable any
alien convicted of a controlled substance offense).
6. Ferreria, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 853.
7. Id. at 855.
8. See id.
9. Id. at 856.
10. See United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
11. See United States v. Farouil, 124 F.3d 838, 847 (7th Cir. 1997).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco-Soto, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1206 (D.N.M. 2005);
United States v. Bakeas, 987 F. Supp. 44, 44–45 (D. Mass. 1997).
13. See United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 645–47 (2d Cir. 1993); infra note 251
and accompanying text; see also United States v. Wills, 476 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 2007).
14. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253 (2005) (Breyer, J., delivering the
opinion of the Court in part).
15. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
16. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT tbl.26
(2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/
Quarterly_Sentencing_Updates/USSC_2010_Quarter_Report_4th.pdf.
Factoring out
immigration offenses, 21.76% of offenders are noncitizens. See id. The vast majority of
these nonimmigration offenders face drug trafficking charges, with fraud charges a distant
second. See id.

2132

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

intermingling of immigration consequences with the modern federal
sentencing scheme poses far-reaching questions to proponents of fair and
For these reasons, in January 2010, the
consistent sentencing. 18
Commission sought public comments on whether it should amend the
Guidelines to address these issues. 19
This Note explains the legal conflict over consideration of the
consequences of alienage in federal sentencing and argues that since United
States v. Booker, 20 sentencing courts can consider the immigration
consequences at issue. Part I of this Note details the modern federal
sentencing scheme, immigration law and policy, and the intermingling of
these two fields when noncitizens are sentenced in federal courts. Part II
describes the split among federal courts as to the propriety of considering
various immigration consequences when crafting a sentence. Part III of this
Note argues that the Guidelines should be amended to recognize
deportability as a proper sentencing factor, and in the absence of such a
reform, sentencing courts should consider the consequences of immigration
under Congress’s command to mete out sentences that are “sufficient, but
not greater than necessary” 21 in furtherance of other explicit statutory
sentencing goals.
I. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING SCHEME, IMMIGRATION LAW, AND THEIR
OVERLAP
Part I.A examines modern federal sentencing from the promulgation of
mandatory guidelines through the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal decision in
United States v. Booker, and subsequent analyses of the advisory guidelines
scheme. Part I.B considers the contours of immigration law, describing
who can be removed for what offenses, and touches upon the debate over
the jurisprudential formalism that deportation is not a form of punishment.
Part I.C describes the interaction between sentencing and immigration law
and the particular burdens that noncitizen inmates face.

17. Per 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006), “drug trafficking crime[s]” are aggravated
felonies, convictions for which noncitizens are deportable under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
18. See Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Dir., ACLU Wash. Legislative Office, to U.S.
Sentencing
Comm’n
3–5
(Mar.
22,
2010),
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20100317/ACLU_Murp
hy_Comments.pdf [hereinafter Murphy Letter] (urging the Commission to adopt provisions
for downward departures to address the effects of deportation and disparate treatment of
noncitizen prisoners). In December 2010 at the close of his term, New York Governor
David Paterson granted pardons to several people whose convictions would have subjected
them to deportation, a consequence the Governor felt was needlessly harsh. 24 Immigrants
Pardoned by Governor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2010, at A23.
19. See Notice of Proposed Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines, 75 Fed. Reg. 3525,
3531 (Jan. 21, 2010).
20. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
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A. Federal Sentencing: Courts, Congress, and the Commission
This section describes the development of federal sentencing law in three
central law-making bodies: Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Commission. As these bodies modify the allocation of sentencing power,
the proper consideration of alienage consequences changes as well.
1. Judicial Discretion at Its Apex: Pre-Guidelines Federal Sentencing
Throughout U.S. history, the underlying rationale for meting out criminal
punishment has shifted, and as the rationale shifts, so too does the
sentencing process. 22 From the outset of the American republic, criminal
punishment had a retributive focus, and legislatures set the punishment for a
particular crime. 23 Gradually, retributive sentencing gave way to reform
models. 24 Thus, for a century prior to the enactment of the Guidelines,
United States criminal systems used schemes of “indeterminate
sentencing” 25 where rehabilitation was the primary rationale for criminal
punishment. 26 Constrained only by statutory maximums and minimums,
judges applied sentences with a great degree of discretion, 27 and
rehabilitated prisoners were released upon the decision of corrections
officers, often many years before the expiration of the sentence the court
had imposed. 28 In the system of indeterminate sentencing, virtually no
appellate review took place. 29
One prominent critic, U.S. District Court Judge Marvin E. Frankel,
criticized the “unchecked and sweeping powers” of judges in the
indeterminate sentencing model, and called that discretion “terrifying and

22. See infra notes 23–28, 47 and accompanying text.
23. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1978) (describing the changing
rationales for punishment in the United States from the late eighteenth century through the
mid-twentieth century). Capital punishment was quite common in the colonial era. See Alan
M. Dershowitz, Criminal Sentencing in the United States: An Historical and Conceptual
Overview, 423 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 117, 125 (1976). For lesser crimes,
legislatures imposed fines, whippings, and time in the stocks. Id. Incarceration was not
typically employed as a post-conviction form of punishment until after the American
Revolution. Id.
24. See Grayson, 438 U.S. at 46; Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion:
The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 893 (1990).
25. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989). Sentences were indeterminate
due to a parole board’s determination of when they would end, see id. at 365, and to judges’
ability to sentence a defendant to a broad range, such as ten years to life. See Dershowitz,
supra note 23, at 128–29.
26. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363 (stating that pre-Guidelines sentencing was based on
“a view that it was realistic to attempt to rehabilitate the inmate”); Nagel, supra note 24, at
893 (describing the advent of rehabilitative punishment in 1870); cf. MARVIN E. FRANKEL,
CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 7 (1973) (arguing that “legislators . . . have
neglected even to sketch democratically determined statements of basic purpose”).
27. FRANKEL, supra note 26, at 5.
28. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364–65.
29. See Symposium, Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249, 259–60 (1962);
Carissa Byrne Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Policy Decisions After Kimbrough,
93 MARQ. L. REV. 717, 719 (2009).
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intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of law.”30
According to Judge Frankel, this discretion-laden scheme resulted in
sentences that lacked uniformity, order, and equality. 31 While the system
sought to impose sentences that were individualized, according to Judge
Frankel, the resulting punishments were instead the result of “character,
bias, neurosis, and daily vagary.” 32
2. Congress Steps In: The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
Concerns about excessive judicial discretion 33 and unequal sentences for
similarly situated defendants 34 motivated the enactment of the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 (SRA). 35 The SRA created the Commission, an
independent agency in the judicial branch charged with establishing federal
sentencing policy to “provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes
of sentencing” and reduce “unwarranted sentencing disparities.” 36 The
SRA also spelled out duties of the Commission and indicated what factors it
might consider in crafting a set of guidelines.37
Congress had three objectives in establishing the Commission and the
Guidelines. First, it sought to increase transparency in sentencing by
avoiding the “implicit deception” that exists when a judge imposes a
sentence and a parole board determines how much of that sentence is
actually served. 38 Second, Congress pursued increased uniformity by
narrowing the range of sentences imposed for similar conduct.39 Third, it
intended that sentences be proportionate to the offense, with increasingly
severe sentences for increasingly severe crimes. 40
Congress articulated several traditional goals of sentencing in the SRA.
A sentence should: (1) punish the offender, reflect the gravity of the
30. FRANKEL, supra note 26, at 5.
31. See id. at 8–9.
32. Id. at 21. Another judge argued that, in the system of indeterminate sentencing,
judges generally “behaved badly”—that is, they imposed sentences intended to rehabilitate
and deter without any objective basis for their calculation. Nancy Gertner, Sentencing
Reform: When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57 ME. L. REV. 569, 572 (2005).
33. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 292–93 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in
part) (noting that “[t]he elimination of sentencing disparity, which Congress determined was
chiefly the result of a discretionary sentencing regime, was unquestionably Congress’
principal aim” in enacting the SRA).
34. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 365 (1989).
35. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3551–3742 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998); see also Preliminary Observations of the
Commission on Commissioner Robinson’s Dissent, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,046, 18,133 (May 13,
1987) (noting that Judge Frankel’s criticism of disparity spurred sentencing reform).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006).
37. Id. § 994.
38. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (2010). Under the system of
indeterminate sentencing and parole, inmates typically served only one-third of their
sentences. See id.; see also Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) (describing
Congress’s purposes in passing the SRA).
39. U.S.S.G. § 1A1.3; Breyer, supra note 38, at 4–5.
40. See U.S.S.G. § 1A1.3; Nagel, supra note 24, at 905.
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offense, and maintain respect for law, 41 (2) deter future offenses,42 (3)
protect the public,43 and (4) provide the offender with correctional or
educational treatment. 44 Under the “parsimony principal,” 45 an offender’s
term should be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to accomplish
those ends. 46
The resulting Guidelines shifted focus away from rehabilitative rationales
in sentencing and, some argue, toward retributive rationales.47 Others fault
the Guidelines for failing to adopt one single dominant rationale among the
several articulated. 48 The Commission itself stated that the choice of a
single guiding philosophy was “unnecessary.” 49 Notwithstanding, the
Commission has a continuing obligation to update the Guidelines to accord
with evolving understandings of criminal justice 50 and takes particular
notice of circuit splits in promulgating amendments. 51
The history of the Guidelines can be split into two major phases: preBooker and post-Booker. From their enactment in 1987 through 2005, the
Guidelines were mandatory and judges were required to impose a sentence
within the Guidelines range unless a specific provision for departure
applied. 52 In 2005, the Supreme Court held in Booker that the mandatory
Guidelines were unconstitutional, and rendered them advisory to preserve
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2006).
42. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B).
43. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C).
44. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D).
45. See Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 68 (2005)
(describing parsimony as “a preference for the least severe alternative that will achieve the
purposes of the sentence”).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see also Frase, supra note 45, at 82 (noting that § 3553(a)
expresses the parsimony principal).
47. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (2006) (“The Commission shall insure that the guidelines
reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the
purpose of rehabilitating the defendant . . . .”); Ricardo J. Bascuas, The American
Inquisition: Sentencing After the Federal Guidelines, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 6–7
(2010) (arguing that the Guidelines repudiated rehabilitation as the primary function of
incarceration, and elevated retribution to the dominant sentencing rationale).
48. See Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding
and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19,
26 (2003). But cf. Dershowitz, supra note 23, at 122 (noting the utility of imprisonment as a
form of crime reduction because it “conveniently combines” mechanisms for the various
goals of punishment).
49. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (2010).
50. Congress has instructed the Commission, in consultation with other federal legal
organizations, to “periodically” review the Guidelines, and the Commission may submit
amendments each spring, which become effective if Congress does not object to them. See
28 U.S.C. § 994(o)–(p).
51. See Notice of Proposed Priorities, 75 Fed. Reg. 41,927 (July 19, 2010) (indicating
that the resolution of conflicting interpretations of the Guidelines is a Commission priority).
The Commission has recently addressed certain immigration-related departures. See infra
notes 183–185 and accompanying text.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2006), invalidated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005); see also Symposium, Federal Sentencing Under “Advisory” Guidelines:
Observations By District Judges, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 6 (2006) (statement of Hon. Nancy
Gertner) (“Over time, judicial departures were seen as a lack of compliance with the
Guidelines.”).
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their adherence to the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee.53 Booker
required that a sentence be informed not only by the Guidelines range but
also by the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).54 Through both phases,
the proper calculation of a Guidelines sentence remained the same, 55 but the
influence of that calculation on the ultimate sentence decreased.56 In the
Guidelines’ three-decade history, the Court and Congress have modified the
level of appellate scrutiny of a sentence several times.
3. The Guidelines Computation, Departures, and Variances
The Guidelines lay out a step-by-step process to usher sentencing judges
to a recommended range. 57 A judge calculates a score by determining the
“offense level” 58—based on the crime committed with adjustments for
certain factors, such as whether the defendant played a major or a minor
role in the offense 59—and a “criminal history” score, which considers the
prior offenses of the defendant. 60 The judge arrives at an offense score
between one and forty-three, and a criminal history categorization between
one and six. 61 A sentencing table 62 provides a narrow63 recommended
sentence range based on the combination of these two scores.
As enacted, the Guidelines were mandatory. 64 A court was required to
sentence within the Guidelines recommendation unless one of two
situations permitting departure existed.65 First, if a Guidelines-based
provision for departure applied, the court could decrease a sentence on that
basis. 66 Otherwise, a judge could depart upon finding that aggravating or
mitigating factors made a case fundamentally different from what the
Guidelines contemplated67—that is to say, the case fell outside the
“heartland.” 68 Regardless, the Commission expected departures to be
53. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 226–27 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in
part).
54. See id. at 245–46 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part);
Symposium, supra note 52, at 4 (statement of Hon. Lynn Adelman).
55. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part).
56. See Symposium, supra note 52, at 4 (statement of Hon. Lynn Adelman) (noting that
with Booker, the primary sentencing focus shifted from the Guidelines to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)).
57. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2010).
58. Id. § 2.
59. Id. § 3B1.2.
60. Id. § 4A1.1.
61. Id. § 5A.
62. Id. According to one district judge, under the mandatory Guidelines scheme, “the
grid was God.” Symposium, supra note 52, at 4 (statement of Hon. Lynn Adelman).
63. U.S.S.G. § 1A1.2.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006) (stating that a “court shall impose a sentence” in
compliance with the Guidelines).
65. See id.
66. See U.S.S.G. §§ 5K1.1, 5K2.1–.24 (providing bases for upward and downward
departures, including substantial assistance to authorities, the use of a dangerous weapon,
and diminished capacity).
67. See id. § 5K2.0.
68. Id. § 1A4(b); see Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 93 (1996) (citing U.S.S.G.
§ 1A4(b)) (describing the Guidelines’ applicability as reaching a “heartland” or a
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rare. 69 The SRA instituted a multi-pronged scheme of appellate review,
with varying levels of scrutiny applying depending on the type of deviation
from the Guidelines range. 70
The Guidelines do not discuss alienage consequences as sentencing
factors, 71 however recent modifications have increased the focus on
While national origin is explicitly prohibited from
alienage. 72
consideration, 73 alienage and deportability are not.74
4. The Tug-of-War Continues: Judicial and Legislative Reactions to the
Guidelines
Since their inception, the Guidelines have faced serious legal
challenges. 75 In the Guidelines’ lifespan, their model for federal sentencing
has witnessed a tug-of-war between various loci of sentencing power—the
legislative and judicial branches, depending on the higher prioritization of
uniformity or judicial discretion,76 and, relatedly, between trial and
appellate courts, in determining the proper amount of appellate scrutiny for
the sentence imposed.77 Per the Commission’s mandate, 78 the Guidelines
are regularly amended to better suit evolving criminal justice standards.79
representative set of cases, and leaving sentencing judges the discretion to depart when
particular factors make a case “unusual”).
69. U.S.S.G. § 1A1.3 (“Relevant distinctions not reflected in the guidelines probably
will occur rarely and sentencing courts may take such unusual cases into account by
departing from the guidelines.”).
70. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 308 & n.7 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting
in part).
71. See United States v. Lopez-Salas, 266 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Other than for
crimes related directly to alien status, such as illegal re-entry into the country, the guidelines
do not mention the effects of alien status as a departure factor.”). This Note addresses
convictions for nonimmigration crimes. Because immigration crimes are generally
committed by noncitizens who are likely to face immigration consequences, courts have
found that the Guidelines implicitly take those consequences into consideration. See, e.g.,
United States v. Garay, 235 F.3d 230, 233 & n.15 (5th Cir. 2000). Thus, those offenses and
offenders are outside the scope of this Note.
72. See infra Part I.A.5.
73. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10.
74. See United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 643–44 (2d Cir. 1993), for the
distinction between considering national origin and alienage.
75. For example, in 1989, the Supreme Court held that the Guidelines were
constitutional on separation of powers and non-delegation grounds. See Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
76. See Statements of Sens. Kennedy and Leahy Supporting the JUDGES Act, 15 FED.
SENT’G REP. 372, 372 (2003) (statement of Senator Kennedy in support of repeal of portions
of the Feeney Amendment to return discretion to sentencing judges); see also United States
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part)
(“We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a
sentence within a statutory range.”).
77. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98–100 (1996) (noting the Government’s
position that more stringent appellate review furthers the goal of uniformity); In re
Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. 262, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“In effect, primary sentencing authority
is shifted to the appellate judges whenever a trial court provides a lower sentence than do the
Guidelines matrices. For a judge to exercise what amounts to original power to sentence
without actually seeing the person being sentenced is contrary to American tradition, as
recognized in Koon.”).
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i. Initial Responses to the Mandatory Guidelines
Nine years after the Guidelines went into effect, the Supreme Court
significantly increased district court discretion. In Koon v. United States,80
the Court held that so long as a factor is not expressly prohibited in the
Guidelines, it may be considered for a downward departure.81 By weighing
in on how to interpret silence in the Guidelines, the Court widened
sentencing courts’ ability to depart.82 The Court clarified that the
Guidelines only intend to reach a “heartland” of cases, and departures may
be appropriate for cases outside of that paradigmatic set. 83 The Koon Court
noted that the SRA “authorizes [departure] in cases that feature aggravating
or mitigating circumstances of a kind or degree not adequately taken into
consideration by the Commission.” 84 Furthermore, the Court held that
sentencing decisions should receive abuse of discretion review on appeal.85
ii. The PROTECT Act
In 2003, Congress drastically altered sentencing procedure with the
Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children
Today Act (PROTECT Act). 86 Primarily aimed at targeting the sexual
exploitation of children, the PROTECT Act also contained the Feeney
Amendment, 87 which aimed to further increase sentence uniformity and
decrease judicial discretion. 88 The resulting legislation limited courts’
ability to depart downward, instituted de novo appellate review of
downward departures, required reports to Congress for downward
departures, and forbade the Commission from adding any new grounds for
departure to Chapter 5K for two years. 89 Despite its otherwise hard line
against downward departures, the PROTECT Act also endorsed early
78. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
79. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A2 (2010); supra note 50.
80. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
81. Id. at 94.
82. See id. at 96.
83. Id. at 93–94 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A4(b) (1995)).
84. Koon, 518 U.S. at 94; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0, cmt.
n.3 (2010).
85. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 100; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006) (setting out the bases
for appeal and standards of review for various sentencing decisions).
86. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.
Titles 18, 21, 28, 42, and 47).
87. Id. § 401, 117 Stat. at 667 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3742 and 28 U.S.C
§§ 991, 994 (2006)).
88. See Tom Feeney, Reaffirming the 1984 Sentencing Reforms, 27 HAMLINE L. REV.
383, 385 (2004) (indicating that the purpose of the Feeney Amendment was to decrease the
rate of downward departures and reduce disparities in sentencing).
89. See § 401, 117 Stat. at 673–76; see also Mark H. Allenbaugh, Who’s Afraid of the
Federal Judiciary? Why Congress’ Fear of Judicial Sentencing Discretion May Undermine
a Generation of Reform, THE CHAMPION, June 2003, at 6, 8 (calling the Feeney Amendment
a sentencing “coup d’état”). One district judge resigned in protest to the changes that, in his
view, were unjustly rigid and designed to intimidate sentencing judges into sentencing
within the Guidelines. See John S. Martin, Jr., Op-Ed., Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A31.
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disposition, or “fast track,” programs. 90 Under those programs, U.S.
Attorneys in certain specified border states had authorized downward
departures for those charged with illegal reentry in exchange for a waiver of
certain procedural rights.91
iii. United States v. Booker
Congress’s effort to limit judicial discretion was largely undone,
however, with the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in United States v.
Booker. 92 The Court issued two majority opinions in Booker. 93 The first,
known as the “merits opinion,” was written by Justice John Paul Stevens,
and held that mandatory guidelines violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury. 94 The Court held that by requiring a sentencing judge
to find facts beyond those that the jury used to convict, and by calling for
judges to increase sentences on the basis of facts not found beyond a
reasonable doubt, the Guidelines interfere with the jury trial right.95 Justice
Breyer’s “remedial opinion” determined that congressional intent counseled
severing and invalidating the mandatory provisions to make the Guidelines
advisory, thereby avoiding the constitutional issue. 96 The full Court agreed
that a sentencing judge’s exercise of discretion does not violate the Sixth
Amendment in the way that mandatory application of facts does. 97
Booker’s effect was thus to allow a sentencing court to consider the
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 in addition to the properly
calculated Guidelines range. 98 Accordingly, a post-Booker sentencing court
has more options than a pre-Booker court. It can sentence within the
Guidelines range, depart from the Guidelines as before, or apply a variance
under § 3553(a). 99 Therefore, the law on Guidelines departures from before
90. See § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. at 675; U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5K3.1 (2010).
91. See Thomas E. Gorman, Comment, Fast-Track Sentencing Disparity: Rereading
Congressional Intent to Resolve the Circuit Split, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 479, 489–90 (2010)
(arguing that fast track sentencing’s better allocation of resources reduces disparity because
far fewer cases of illegal reentry go unprosecuted).
92. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
93. Five Justices joined each opinion, and Justice Ginsburg was the only Justice to join
both. The four other Justices that joined the “merits opinion”—the opinion that decided that
the mandatory Guidelines were unconstitutional—all dissented from the remedial opinion—
the portion that rendered the Guidelines advisory—and vice versa. See id. at 226, 244, 272,
313, 326; Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal
System, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 341, 345–46 (2006) (describing the makeup of the “dueling
majorities”).
94. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226–27 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part).
95. Id. at 232, 244.
96. Id. at 245–46 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part).
97. Id. at 233 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part) (“[W]hen a trial
judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the
defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.”).
98. Id. at 245–46 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part).
99. See supra notes 66–68, 98 and accompanying text. Since Booker, the viability of the
“departure” terminology has been questioned. See Thomas Withers, Supreme Court—
Defendants Not Entitled to Notice of Variance from Guideline Sentence, FED. CRIM. DEF.
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Booker remains valid, but following Booker, a factor that did not form the
basis for a departure may nonetheless justify a downward variance. 100
A variance is a divergence from the Guidelines recommendation based
on factors outside the Guidelines framework. 101 Section 3553(a) requires
determining a sentence with a view toward Congress’s purposes of
punishment. 102 Thus, under advisory Guidelines, courts must consider “the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics”
of the offender 103 and the various types of sentence available,104 including
imprisonment, fines, or probation. The court must take account of “the
need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities”105 among similarly situated
defendants. 106
The Booker opinions do not provide a clear mandate to district courts.107
While the merits opinion in Booker has been interpreted to give judges carte
blanche to vary from the Guidelines, 108 under the remedial opinion,

BLOG (June 15, 2008, 5:00 PM) http://www.federalcriminaldefenseblog.com/tags/variances/
(calling departures “a deceased creature” of the pre-Booker era). However, as the language
of departure remains in the Guidelines, this Note will use “departure” to refer to divergences
from the Guidelines range that rely on the Guidelines themselves, and “variance” to
distinguish divergences based on § 3553 dictates. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL
REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 57 (2006),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony
_and_Reports/Submissions/200603_Booker/Booker_Report.pdf.
100. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46.
101. See United States v. Castro-Rivas, 254 F. App’x 742, 743 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007).
102. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006); supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
103. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
104. Id. § 3553(a)(3).
105. Id. § 3553(a)(6).
106. This seemingly simple command is not without controversy. Compare Breyer, supra
note 38, at 13 (“Uniformity essentially means treating similar cases alike.”), with Kevin
Cole, The Empty Idea of Sentencing Disparity, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1336, 1336 (1997)
(arguing that “disparity is not a self-defining concept” and for uniformity to have any
meaning, it must be undergirded by a coherent philosophy of punishment).
107. See Graham C. Mullen & J.P. Davis, Mandatory Guidelines: The Oxymoronic State
of Sentencing After United States v. Booker, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 625, 631 (2007); see also
Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 846 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Apprendi,
Booker, Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough have given the lower courts a good deal to digest over a
relatively short period.”). It is worth noting that in addition to criticism, Booker has received
praise as an improvement over the mandatory Guidelines regime. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES JANUARY 2010 THROUGH
MARCH 2010 tbl.19 (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research_
Projects/Surveys/20100608_Judge_Survey.pdf [hereinafter JUDGES’ SURVEY] (finding that
75% of district judges think that the post-Booker advisory Guidelines best achieve the
purposes of sentencing, whereas 3% believe that mandatory Guidelines are better suited to
those ends); Berman, supra note 93, at 343 (arguing that Booker’s changes mostly improved
federal sentencing); Symposium, supra note 52, at 7 (statement of Hon. Nancy Gertner)
(quoting Ryan S. King & Marc Mauer, Sentencing With Discretion: Crack Cocaine
Sentencing After Booker, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 134, 144 (2005)) (calling Booker an
opportunity for more thoughtful and rational sentencing decisions).
108. See United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“District
judges are, as a result [of Booker and its progeny], generally free to impose sentences outside
the recommended range.”).
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sentencing courts are nonetheless required to consider the Guidelines109 and
are subject to appellate review for procedural and substantive
unreasonableness. 110 These holdings create a tension that makes Booker
difficult to apply. 111
iv. Understanding Booker: Rita, Gall, Kimbrough, Spears, and Ice
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions aimed to clarify the post-Booker
applicability of the Guidelines. The Court sought to settle disagreements
over the weight the Guidelines recommendation should carry112 and
relatedly, the amount of appellate scrutiny that should be applied to a
sentence outside of the Guidelines. 113 The Court’s pronouncements
generally indicated the breadth of the sentencing judge’s discretion to
sentence outside the Guidelines based on factors that are not specific to a
particular defendant. 114
In Rita v. United States, 115 the Court held that a sentencing court may not
presume that the Guidelines calculation is reasonable.116 An appellate court
may apply a presumption of reasonableness,117 though importantly, courts
of appeals may not apply a presumption of unreasonableness to sentences
outside the Guidelines. 118 Rita thus maintained the Guidelines’ overall
relevance. 119 In Gall v. United States, 120 the Court found that a court of
appeals may not set a circuit rule that requires “extraordinary
circumstances” to warrant a departure from the Guidelines.121 In other
words, a sentencing court may issue a variance even though the case before
it is a typical one.
On the same day that Gall was issued, the Court handed down its
decision in Kimbrough v. United States. 122 In Kimbrough, the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia had issued a sentence below the
Guidelines range, expressing disagreement with the inconsistent treatment
of powder versus crack cocaine, and finding that the Guidelines
recommendation was greater than necessary to satisfy Congress’s
109. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion
of the Court in part).
110. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); Booker, 543 U.S. at 261.
111. See Berman, supra note 93, at 355 (“[T]he Supreme Court in Booker ultimately
raised more questions than it answered concerning the day-to-day particulars of operating an
advisory sentencing guideline system.”); David J. D’Addio, Sentencing After Booker: The
Impact of Appellate Review on Defendants’ Rights, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 173
(2006).
112. See infra notes 115–34 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 144–62 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 125–28, 286 and accompanying text.
115. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
116. Id. at 354–55.
117. Id. at 347.
118. Id. at 354–55.
119. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
120. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
121. Id. at 47.
122. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
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sentencing objectives. 123 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed, holding that it was “per se unreasonable” for the district court to
vary from the Guidelines based solely on its disagreement with the
underlying policy that the Guidelines espoused and the resulting disparity
between crack and cocaine sentencing. 124 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that a sentencing “judge may determine . . . that, in the particular
case, a within-Guidelines sentence is ‘greater than necessary’ to serve the
objectives of sentencing.” 125 In other words, a court is entitled to read the
broad dictates of the § 3553(a) factors to trump the Guidelines
recommendation. 126 The Court further noted that since Booker, “some
departures from uniformity were a necessary cost” of honoring the Sixth
Amendment through the newly-advisory scheme. 127 The Court reiterated
its point in Spears v. United States, 128 stating that “district courts are
entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crack cocaine Guidelines
based on a policy disagreement with those Guidelines.” 129
Adding to the current state of confusion, in 2009 the Court decided
Oregon v. Ice, 130 which dealt not with the Guidelines, but with the Sixth
Amendment’s influence on an Oregon statute allowing a judge to find facts
for the imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences. 131 The
Court found that the statute did not violate the Sixth Amendment, deferring
to the traditional province of the jury and to the state’s ability to craft its
criminal law.132 The Ice majority was apparently motivated by the nature
of the particular statute that, in the Court’s view, constrained judicial
discretion by requiring an affirmative finding before the imposition of
consecutive sentences, rather than leaving consecutive sentences as a

123. Id. at 92–93 (discussing the district court’s decision).
124. United States v. Kimbrough, 174 F. App’x 798, 799 (4th Cir. 2006), rev’d, 552 U.S.
85 (2007).
125. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 91 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)).
126. Kimbrough’s mandate remains debatable, however, as some courts have interpreted
its grant of discretion broadly, to apply to all Guidelines, while others have interpreted it
narrowly, applying only to the crack-cocaine provisions. Compare United States v. Corner,
598 F.3d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 2010) (“We understand Kimbrough and Spears to mean that
district judges are at liberty to reject any Guideline on policy grounds—though they must act
reasonably when using that power.”), with United States v. Vandewege, 561 F.3d 608, 610
(6th Cir. 2009) (Gibbons, J., concurring) (“Neither Kimbrough nor Spears authorized district
courts to categorically reject the policy judgments of the Sentencing Commission in areas
outside of crack-cocaine offenses, as the majority suggests.”), and Hessick, supra note 29, at
718 (“Kimbrough tells appellate courts that they must allow district courts to categorically
disagree with the sentencing policy underlying the crack cocaine Guideline, but it did not
extend that holding to all Guidelines. To the contrary, the Court cautioned that district court
disagreements with other Guidelines may be subject to ‘closer review’ by the courts of
appeals.”).
127. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 108.
128. 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009) (per curiam).
129. Id. at 843–44.
130. 129 S. Ct. 711 (2009).
131. See id. at 714.
132. Id. at 717.
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potential default.133 The tension with Booker remains significant because
the statute unambiguously permits a judge to unilaterally find facts used to
increase a defendant’s sentence.134
v. Appellate Review of Sentencing Decisions
The SRA originally laid out a multi-pronged scheme for the review of a
sentence on appeal. 135 In Koon, the Supreme Court held that appellate
review should be for abuse of discretion. 136 With the enactment of the
Feeney Amendment, Congress indicated that all appellate review would be
de novo. 137 Congress’s purpose in heightening the level of appellate review
was to encourage within-Guidelines sentences and discourage
departures. 138 De novo review did not last because in addition to excising
the statutory provision that made the Guidelines mandatory, 139 the Booker
remedy also invalidated the mandatory portions of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), the
SRA’s provision establishing a standard of review. 140 The Court
interpreted the remaining portions of the statute to call for reasonableness
review on appeal. 141
The level of appellate review is crucial to the implementation of advisory
Guidelines. 142 With renewed discretion at the district level, one judge
noted that appellate courts take on a vital role in “channel[ing] discretion”
and policing “deviations from the norm.” 143 However, Justice Scalia’s
Booker dissent draws out the tension between appellate review and nonmandatory Guidelines. 144 On the one hand, increased appellate review may
133. See id. at 719 (“It bears emphasis that state legislative innovations like Oregon’s
seek to rein in the discretion judges possessed at common law to impose consecutive
sentences at will.”).
134. See id. at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the difficulty of reconciling Ice with
previous Supreme Court sentencing decisions).
135. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2006); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 308 & n.7
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
136. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 99 (1996).
137. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
138. See Feeney, supra note 88, at 383.
139. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (indicating that the court “shall” sentence as per the
Guidelines requirement, unless a basis for departure applies).
140. Booker, 543 U.S. at 260 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part).
141. Id. at 260–61.
142. See Gerard E. Lynch, Letting Guidelines Be Guidelines (and Judges Be Judges),
OSJCL
AMICI:
VIEWS
FROM
THE
FIELD
1,
5
(Jan.
2008),
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/osjcl/blog/Articles_1/Lynch-final-12-28-07.pdf (“If an ideal
sentencing system tries to limit disparity to that which is the inevitable cost of a reasonable
method of discretion, appellate review of sentences that appear to go off the reservation is an
important component of that system.”); id. (noting that “there are some cases in which the
weight (however strong or slight) given to the guidelines will be the deciding factor” in
calculating a sentence under advisory guidelines); Ronald F. Wright, Rules for Sentencing
Revolutions, 108 YALE L.J. 1355, 1383 (1999) (book review) (suggesting that “appellate
judges can serve as the coordinators for sentencing judges”).
143. James G. Carr, Some Thoughts on Sentencing Post-Booker, 17 FED. SENT’G REP.
295, 296 (2005).
144. Booker, 543 U.S. at 306 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (“If the Guidelines are no
longer binding, one would think that the provision designed to ensure compliance with them
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be a de facto limit on district court discretion.145 Yet where district courts
have more discretion, closer appellate review becomes necessary if
sentencing is to remain faithful to Congress’s goal of increased
uniformity. 146
Subsequent to Booker, the Court has added to the discourse on appellate
review of sentencing in the advisory Guidelines scheme. Although Gall
rejected heightened scrutiny for sentences outside the Guidelines,147 and
recharacterized the level of appellate scrutiny as requiring abuse of
discretion review, 148 the precise nature of that review remains somewhat
unclear. 149 Several of the Court’s recent holdings elevate district court
discretion but simultaneously contain language that seems to encourage
scrutiny in appellate review. 150 For example, Kimbrough is frequently cited
for recognizing district courts’ ability to deviate from the Guidelines based
on a categorical disagreement—a disagreement with the Guidelines
themselves instead of the circumstances a particular defendant presents, at

would, in its totality, be inoperative. The Court holds otherwise.”); Hessick, supra note 29,
at 717 (“Because appellate review is, by its terms, a limit on district court discretion, the
Court’s post-Booker sentencing jurisprudence is inherently contradictory.”).
145. See Stephanos Bibas et al., Policing Politics at Sentencing, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1371,
1371 (2009).
146. See Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing
Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2008); see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 246 (Breyer, J.,
delivering the opinion of the Court in part) (noting the remedial opinion’s adherence to
Congress’s intention of increased uniformity).
147. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
148. Id. at 56; see also Hessick & Hessick, supra note 146, at 13–18 (discussing the
difference between reasonableness review and abuse of discretion review).
149. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 26 (2009) (noting the development
of circuit splits due to the appellate “courts’ continuing efforts to define their role in
reviewing sentences for reasonableness in light of the Supreme Court’s opinions in Booker,
Rita, Kimbrough, [and] Gall”); Hessick, supra note 29, at 717–18 (“Although obviously
intended to clarify appellate review, the Court’s opinion in Kimbrough has actually led to
additional confusion and created new circuit conflicts. . . . [B]ecause strict appellate review
would ultimately eliminate district court discretion, the Court has had to twist the appellate
process and issue opinions, like Kimbrough, that contain facially inconsistent statements.”)
(footnotes omitted).
150. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 146, at 13 (“[P]ortions of Kimbrough and Gall
appear to allow for more searching appellate review of sentencing decisions than the
extremely deferential review, endorsed in other portions of those opinions . . . .”). Compare
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007) (accepting the Government’s argument
that “courts may vary [from Guidelines ranges] based solely on policy considerations,
including disagreements with the Guidelines”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted), and Gall, 552 U.S. at 46 (holding that a “rule requiring ‘proportional’
justifications for departures from the Guidelines range is not consistent with our remedial
opinion in United States v. Booker”), with Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109 (“[W]hile the
Guidelines are no longer binding, closer review may be in order when the sentencing judge
varies from the Guidelines based solely on the judge’s view that the Guidelines range ‘fails
properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations’ even in a mine-run case.” (quoting Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007))), and Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 (“We find it
uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a more significant justification
than a minor one.”). Ice, the Court’s most recent statement on sentencing, stands in stark
contrast to the Guidelines cases because it extols the Oregon statute’s limitations on judicial
discretion. See Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 719 (2009).
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least with respect to crack and cocaine.151 Yet Kimbrough also counsels
that, when a district court varies in a prototypical case based on its
determination that the Guidelines do not reflect § 3553 considerations,
“closer [appellate] review may be in order.”152 By concurrently granting
wide, policy-driven discretion to district courts 153 but making that
discretion reviewable by appellate courts, 154 the Supreme Court has issued
arguably inconsistent instructions about the exercise of sentencing
discretion. 155
In 2009, approximately 8% of sentences were appealed156 and of those,
only 6.5% were reversed. 157 But notably, when the government was the
party challenging a sentence, 158 the sentence was reversed 56.3% of the
time. 159 As one scholar points out, the government’s motive in bringing a
criminal appeal is generally rooted in its desire to shape legal rules, rather
than win individual cases. 160 By appealing sentences, the government often
seeks to modify the definition of “reasonableness” that governs review.161
The fact that the government wins more than half of its challenges to
district court reasonableness underscores the point of Booker’s critics—that
the specter of reversal is a constraint on sentencing courts and may
influence the policies those courts adopt.162
Over one quarter of the government’s appeals in 2009 challenged
application of the § 3553 factors.163 The terms of § 3553 are so broad, 164
however, that reversal for unreasonableness or abuse of discretion raises
questions about how courts reach opposite conclusions when the same
§ 3553 issue is raised. Conflicting outcomes indicate that the appellate

151. See supra note 126.
152. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109.
153. See id. at 101.
154. See id. at 109.
155. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
156. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 149, at 33, 44 (2009) (reporting that
6,507 sentences were appealed out of 81,372 reported cases).
157. Id. at 44.
158. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)(3) (2006) (granting the government the right to appeal a
below-Guidelines sentence).
159. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
tbl.56a (2009). In contrast, when a defendant appealed a sentence, the sentence was reversed
only 6.2% of the time. Id. at tbl.56.
160. See Andrew Hessick, The Impact of Government Appellate Strategies on the
Development of Criminal Law, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 477, 479 (2009).
161. See id. at 488 & n.72 (citing Brief for the United States at 41, Claiborne v. United
States, 551 U.S. 87 (2007) (No. 06-5618), 2007 WL 186287 at *41).
162. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 391 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“What
works on appeal determines what works at trial . . . .”); Wright, supra note 142, at 1384
(“[A]ppellate judges [should] select certain patterns they notice in trial court decision, and
. . . cultivate those sentencing practices at the expense of others.”).
163. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 159, at tbl.58 (reporting that in sixty-four
appeals, eighteen involved § 3553).
164. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 63 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that
the § 3553(a) factors “are so broad that they impose few real restraints on sentencing
judges”).
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courts may differ in the amount of scrutiny they apply to the variance
analysis 165 or may be injecting policy preferences into the calculus.166
vi. The Relevance of Advisory Guidelines
The Guidelines retain relevance after Booker for several reasons. First,
per Booker’s express command, sentencing courts must consider the
Guidelines range in computing a sentence.167 The pre-Booker case law
retains validity with regard to what constitutes a permissible departure,
though after Booker, a district court can reduce a sentence based on a factor
within the broad variance grounds but outside the narrow departure
grounds. 168 Courts continue to cite cases from before Booker, applying the
logic of decisions that in turn rely on the formerly mandatory scheme,
thereby keeping that reasoning relevant. 169 Indeed, excluding governmentsponsored downward departures, judges still sentence within the Guidelines
range nearly seventy-five percent of the time. 170
Second, Booker’s internal inconsistencies render its guidance less than
clear. 171 One scholar characterizes the Booker problem as creating a
“fundamental tension between promoting adherence to the Guidelines
without running afoul of the Sixth Amendment.” 172 For a court unsure of
Booker’s mandate, it is safe to sentence within the Guidelines 173 because

165. Compare United States v. Wills, 476 F.3d 103, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that
deportation does not reduce the need for a sentence to incapacitate), with United States v.
Ngatia, 477 F.3d 496, 502 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that deportation does reduce the need for
a sentence to incapacitate).
166. See Lynch, supra note 142, at 5 (arguing that appellate review should create a
common law of sentencing that articulates what is “sensible” policy); Wright, supra note
142, at 1383 (“Appellate courts take the lead in common-law development. They identify
trends, extrapolate general principles from the patterns they discern in particular cases, and
require courts in their jurisdiction to adopt the chosen principles over other (perhaps equally
sensible) competing principles.”).
167. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005) (Breyer, J., delivering the
opinion of the Court in part) (remedying the Guidelines’ constitutional problem by
“requir[ing] a sentencing court to consider Guidelines ranges” and “permit[ing] the court to
tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well”); see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 49
(stating that “the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark,” though
not the only consideration, in crafting a sentence).
168. See supra note 99–100 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., United States v. Mendez, 362 F. App’x 484, 488 n.4 (6th Cir. 2010); Wills,
476 F.3d at 107; United States v. Arroyo Mojica, 131 F. App’x 80, 82 (9th Cir. 2005).
170. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 16, at tbl.1. Excluding the 25.7% of
sentences affected by a Government-sponsored downward departure, 54.6% of the remaining
74.3%, or 73.5%, of sentences fell within the Guidelines range. Id.
171. See John F. Pfaff, The Future of Appellate Sentencing Review: Booker in the States,
93 MARQ. L. REV. 683, 685 (2009).
172. Hessick, supra note 29, at 741.
173. See Bibas et al., supra note 145, at 1372. As one district judge has pointed out, the
Guidelines have been in place for a generation, and thus many federal judges have no frame
of reference that does not involve a Guidelines determination of a sentence. See Nancy
Gertner, Gall, Kimbrough and Me, OSJCL AMICI: VIEWS FROM THE FIELD 1, 4 (Jan. 2008),
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/osjcl/blog/Articles_1/Final2-Gertner-edit-1-18-08.pdf.
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that sentence may earn particular deference on appeal174 and is less likely to
be reversed. 175 Justice Stevens admitted as much, stating, “I am not blind
to the fact that, as a practical matter, many federal judges continued to treat
the Guidelines as virtually mandatory after our decision in Booker.” 176
5. Recent Immigration-Related Updates to the Guidelines
The Guidelines have recognized certain ways that noncitizens’
experience in the criminal justice system varies from that of citizens. In
addition to sanctioning fast track sentences, 177 the Commission has more
recently enacted one amendment and proposed another that would lessen
the particular burdens of sentencing on noncitizens.
Moreover, in January 2010, the Commission sought public comments on
whether it should directly address alienage consequences in the
Guidelines, 178 but did not include any such amendments in its 2010
updates. Many prominent groups have expressed opinions in favor of and
opposed to an amendment. For example, the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) urged the Commission to adopt the amendment, citing the
longer, harsher prison terms that noncitizens serve and the unwarranted
disparity that those conditions create.179 Opponents of an amendment,
including the Department of Justice and certain members of Congress,
argue that the purpose of the SRA was to base criminal punishment on the
crime committed and the offender’s criminal history, not personal

174. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007); see also United States v.
Sedore, 512 F.3d 819, 829 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (referring to sentencing
courts’ post-Booker, effectively mandatory treatment of the Guidelines as “guidelinitis”).
175. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 354 (acknowledging the defendant’s argument that a nonbinding appellate presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences may
encourage judges to sentence within the Guidelines); Bibas et al., supra note 145, at 1387
(noting that in circuits where the appellate court has adopted a Rita reasonableness
presumption, the Guidelines provide a “safe harbor[]”); Alexandra A.E. Shapiro & Nathan
H. Seltzer, Guidelines or Higher: NYCDL’s Study of Reasonableness Review Reveals the
Courts of Appeals’ Aversion to Parsimony, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 177, 180 (2007) (finding
that between Booker and Rita, only one in over 1,500 within-Guidelines sentences was
reversed on substantive grounds).
176. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 366 (Stevens, J., concurring).
177. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
179. See Murphy Letter, supra note 18, at 2.
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characteristics. 180 However, proponents of an amendment note that § 3553
already requires consideration of the offender’s personal characteristics. 181
i. Departure for Cultural Assimilation
Under the 2010 Guidelines, noncitizens convicted of illegal reentry have
the opportunity for additional lenience in sentencing. 182 Section 2L1.2,
under which those convicted of illegal entry are sentenced, contains a new
application note that provides for downward departures for defendants who
have significant ties to the United States.183 The application note states that
a departure may properly be based on an offender’s family and cultural ties
within the United States if that offender has lived in the United States since
childhood. 184 The departure is explicitly only available to those defendants
whose “cultural ties provided the primary motivation for the defendant’s
illegal reentry.” 185 Thus, on its face, it is unavailable to defendants charged
with nonimmigration crimes or to legal residents.
ii. Departure for Stipulated Order of Deportation
The Commission has proposed an amendment which would sanction a
downward departure for a defendant who stipulates to an order of
deportation. 186 This proposal has not yet been adopted, and is being
considered for inclusion in the Commission’s May 2011 updates. 187
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has indicated its support for
this provision, arguing that it promotes judicial efficiency and fairness to
offenders, particularly those charged with nonimmigration offenses. 188 On
the other hand, opposition to the proposal is premised on a concern that

180. See Letter from Lamar Smith, Ranking Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary, et
al., to William K. Sessions, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 1 (Mar. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20100317/HouseSenate
%20Letter.pdf (noting the “strong opposition” of two Senators and seven Congressmen to
Guidelines amendments that consider offender specific characteristics as inconsistent with
Congressional intent in passing the SRA); Transcript of Public Hearing at 24, U.S.
Sentencing
Comm’n
(Mar.
17,
2010),
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20100
317/Hearing_Transcript.pdf (statement of Tristram J. Coffin, U.S. Attorney, Dist. of Vt.)
(stating that further consideration of offender specific characteristics would “jeopardize
uniformity”).
181. See Letter from Julie Stewart & Mary Price, Families Against Mandatory
Minimums, to William K. Sessions, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 10 (Mar. 22, 2010),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20100317/
FAMMComments%203-22-10.pdf; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006).
182. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. n.8 (2010).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See Notice of Final Priorities, 75 Fed. Reg. 54,699, 54,700 (Sept. 8, 2010).
187. See id.
188. Transcript of Public Hearing at 18–19, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n (Jan. 20, 2010),
available
at
http://ftp.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20100120/Public_Hearing_Transcript.pdf
(statement of John T. Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement).
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defendants will be hurried into consenting to removal and waiving
legitimate defenses.189
B. Immigration Law and the Criminal Alien
This section briefly describes modern immigration law, focusing on how
criminal convictions affect noncitizens. It also considers the tensions
inherent in the doctrine that immigration law is civil and thus so is
deportation, a formalism that results in a lack of full Sixth Amendment
rights in removal proceedings, 190 and treatment of immigration
consequences as “collateral” and thus not relevant to sentencing
decisions. 191
1. Congress’s Broad Removal Power
Congress has plenary authority to determine who may enter the United
States and who may not. 192 In other words, under the traditional plenary
power doctrine, legislative and executive decisions about immigration are
largely insulated from judicial review. 193 Modern immigration policy
generally follows two primary goals in deciding whom to admit: uniting
family members and bringing qualified workers into the country. 194 The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made the removal of
noncitizens convicted of crimes a top priority in its enforcement regime. 195
For the purposes of this Note, the terms “noncitizen” and “alien” are
synonymous. An alien is “any person not a citizen or national of the United
189. See id. at 36–37 (statement of John T. Morton, discussing the point of view of the
immigration bar).
190. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
191. See Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence,
and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 124 (2009).
192. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587–88 (1952) (“The Government’s
power to terminate its hospitality has been asserted and sustained by this Court since the
question first arose. . . . [The Government’s ability to deport noncitizens is] a power inherent
in every sovereign state.”); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) (“The right to expel aliens
is a sovereign power necessary to the safety of the country and only limited by treaty
obligations in respect thereto entered into with other governments.”); Peter H. Schuck, The
Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1984). But see 1 CHARLES
GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 1.03[2][a], 1.03[3][b] (2010) (noting that the plenary power doctrine has been limited but
not overruled).
193. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547 (1990).
194. Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1730 (2009)
(citing ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS & POLICY 297
(6th ed. 2008)); see also Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (setting forth a preference system for
immigration admissions with the categories “Family-Sponsored Immigrants,” “EmploymentBased Immigrants,” and a new category of “Diversity Immigrants”).
195. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement,
to
All
ICE
Employees
1–2
(June
30,
2010),
available
at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/civil_enforcement_priorities.pdf.
The
memorandum also suggests that it might be appropriate to exercise prosecutorial discretion
when dealing with lawful permanent residents, among others. Id. at 4.
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States.” 196 Any noncitizen is subject to immigration laws and as such is
potentially subject to deportation.197 Congress has established many
categories of legal aliens, only a few of which will be mentioned here. A
lawful permanent resident (LPR) is a person who has been “lawfully
accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an
immigrant.” 198 LPRs are more casually known as green card holders. 199
LPRs fall within the legal category of “immigrant” because of their intent to
reside permanently in the United States. 200 Aliens also consist of
nonimmigrant visa holders, including foreign students, and non-visa holders
such as tourists from certain countries. 201 Asylees 202 and refugees203 are
noncitizens granted legal status based on a fear of persecution. Temporary
protected status may be granted to groups of individuals, such as hurricane
victims. 204
Those who enter the United States illegally, or who entered legally but
have otherwise violated the terms of their admission, for example by
overstaying a visa, are illegal immigrants. 205
The Immigration and Nationality Act 206 sets forth six categories of
deportable offenses. 207 The only category relevant to this Note is
deportability for criminal convictions.208
Several types of criminal convictions render a noncitizen removable.
Primary among those are convictions for an “aggravated felony.” 209 Many
196. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 84 (9th ed. 2009),
defining an alien as “[a] person who resides within the borders of a country but is not a
citizen or subject of that country.” The terms “immigrant” and “nonimmigrant” further
distinguish aliens in that an immigrant intends to stay in the United States permanently,
whereas a nonimmigrant does not intend to stay. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15); BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 817.
197. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (“Any alien . . . shall . . . be removed if the alien is within
one or more of the following classes of deportable aliens . . . .”); RICHARD A. BOSWELL,
ESSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW 207 (2d ed. 2009).
198. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20).
199. MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY: A GUIDE
TO REPRESENTING FOREIGN-BORN DEFENDANTS 2 (3d ed. 2008).
200. See supra note 196. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) for the categories of exceptions to
the definition of immigrant.
201. KRAMER, supra note 199, at 3–4.
202. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
203. See id. § 1157.
204. Id. § 1254a; KRAMER, supra note 199, at 6.
205. See KRAMER, supra note 199, at 8; infra note 208.
206. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–
1537).
207. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)–(6); AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL,
IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 7:3 (4th ed. 2010). Before
the legal reforms in 1996, see infra note 224, the process by which a person was removed
from the United States was called “deportation”; since 1996, the process is called “removal.”
See 5 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 192, § 64.01[1].
208. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2). The other classes of deportable aliens are those who: (1)
entered the country illegally or who entered legally but overstayed; (2) have “fail[ed] to
register and falsif[ied] documents;” (3) are removable on “security and related grounds;” (4)
become a “public charge” within five years of entry; or (5) vote illegally in any election. Id.
§ 1227.
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aggravated felonies are violent crimes, 210 although “aggravated felony” is a
term of art that Congress has defined to include a growing set of
offenses. 211 In addition, any alien convicted of a controlled substance
offense 212 or of certain firearm offenses 213 is deportable. Convictions for
crimes of moral turpitude also form the basis for deportation. 214 Crimes of
moral turpitude may include arson, blackmail, embezzlement, forgery, and
theft. 215 Those convicted of one aggravated felony or more than one crime
involving moral turpitude are ineligible for relief from removal. 216
2. The Civil Underpinnings of Removal Policy
Traditional U.S. jurisprudence treats deportation as a basic correction of a
wrong 217 and embraces “the formalism that deportation of any type is never
punishment for constitutional purposes.” 218 Courts have adhered to the
characterization of deportation as an administrative, non-criminal
procedure. 219 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has stated on multiple
209. The term “aggravated felony” includes crimes as diverse as murder, firearms
trafficking, money laundering, and perjury. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), (C), (D), (S).
The term is criticized as being both malleable and a misnomer, applying to offenses not
generally considered aggravated or felonious. See Stumpf, supra note 194, at 1692–93, 1723.
210. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 207, § 7:3.2, at 7-107.
211. See BOSWELL, supra note 197, at 16–17.
212. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
213. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(C).
214. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). One scholar notes that a crime involving moral turpitude
“defies any absolute definition, but has been described as a crime that has a mens rea
requirement and involves conduct that is inherently base or vile, and contrary to the accepted
rules of morality—essentially a crime that is per se or intrinsically wrong.” BOSWELL, supra
note 197, at 50. On the other hand, the Board of Immigration Appeals has defined crimes of
moral turpitude as involving “a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk to
the life or safety of others.” Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571, 572 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing cases).
The State Department has noted that a crime of moral turpitude often involves elements of
“fraud,” “larceny,” and “intent to harm persons or things.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
MANUAL
9
FAM
40.21(a)
N2.2
(2010),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86942.pdf.
215. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 214, at N2.3-1(b).
216. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) & (b)(1)(C) (rendering an alien convicted of an aggravated
felony ineligible for cancellation of removal); see FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 207,
§ 7:3.2, at 7-115.
217. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (“The order of
deportation is not a punishment for crime. It is not a banishment, in the sense in which that
word is often applied to the expulsion of a citizen from his country by way of punishment. It
is but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who has not complied
with the conditions upon the performance of which the government of the nation, acting
within its constitutional authority and through the proper departments, has determined that
his continuing to reside here shall depend.”); see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580, 594 (1952); Garcia v. Holder, 320 F. App’x 288, 291 (5th Cir. 2009); Daniel
Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard
Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1894–95 (2000) (stating that “our courts
have long held that deportation proceedings are civil rather than criminal, and that
deportation, however harsh it may be in practice, is not punishment,” and criticizing that
doctrine as both tautological and counterintuitive).
218. Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation and Justice: A Constitutional Dialogue, 41 B.C. L.
REV. 771, 779 (2000).
219. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594.
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occasions that “deportation may result in the loss ‘of all that makes life
Thus, though formalism persists, it engenders
worth living.’” 220
scholarly 221 and judicial 222 resistance. Nonetheless, removal proceedings
are still treated as civil rather than criminal matters, and accordingly, the
protections of the Sixth Amendment do not all attach.223
Congress enacted significant reforms to immigration law in passing the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA). 224 IIRIRA added new crimes to Congress’s list of aggravated
felonies and removed various avenues of relief for noncitizen convicts
facing deportation. 225 Reacting to this expansion, and noting that the post1996 scheme makes the deportation of many noncitizen offenders
“practically inevitable,” the Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky226
opined that “[t]hese changes confirm our view that, as a matter of federal
law, deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important
part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who
plead guilty to specified crimes.” 227 Moreover, the Padilla Court’s
holding—that a noncitizen defendant can claim ineffective assistance of
counsel where his attorney did not warn him that his conviction would
likely lead to deportation228—rejected the Supreme Court of Kentucky’s
view that deportation was a “collateral” consequence and that “those

220. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259
U.S. 276, 284 (1922)).
221. See, e.g., Kanstroom, supra note 218, at 780–81 (“[E]ach ostensibly civil or
collateral consequence should be considered on the merits to determine whether—under the
circumstances in which it is imposed—it is punishment or not. . . . [because deportation] is
uniquely punitive . . . . The deportation of long-term, legal permanent residents for postentry conduct is imposed as a direct consequence of a prior ‘bad’ act.”); Robert Pauw, A New
Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the Constitution’s Criminal
Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 306 (2000) (mocking the
traditional view of deportation as “nothing more than a polite mechanism for sending home
individuals who do not quite live up to our standards and are not fit to be members of our
community”).
222. See, e.g., Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1527 (3d Cir. 1996) (Sarokin, J.,
concurring) (arguing that for purposes of the Ex Post Facto clause, “[t]he legal fiction that
deportation following a criminal conviction is not punishment is difficult to reconcile with
reality”); Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 590 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that “[i]t
defies common experience to characterize deportation of an alien such as petitioner as
anything other than punishment for his crimes” and noting that Socrates chose death over
exile), rev’d sub nom, Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003).
223. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038–39 (1984); Pauw, supra note 221,
at 309 (noting that in deportation proceedings, a noncitizen does not have the right to a jury
trial, the right to assistance of counsel, or the benefit of the exclusionary rule for illegally
seized evidence).
224. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of Titles 8
and 18 of the U.S. Code); see also 1 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 192,
§ 2.04[14][c] (calling the new law “a major reconfiguring”).
225. BOSWELL, supra note 197, at 16–17.
226. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
227. Id. at 1480.
228. Id. at 1483.
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matters [were] not within the sentencing authority of the state trial
court.” 229
C. Sentencing Noncitizens: Three Contours
Noncitizen defendants challenge the effect of alienage on their sentences
in three primary ways. First, noncitizens convicted of particular crimes are
very likely to be deported. 230 As detailed in Part I.B, any noncitizen
convicted of one aggravated felony or controlled substance offense, or of
two crimes of moral turpitude, is ineligible for relief from deportation, and
thus faces near certain removal from the country. 231
Second, a noncitizen’s time incarcerated may be more burdensome than
that of an otherwise identical citizen because the Bureau of Prison (BOP)
blocks noncitizens’ access to two types of benefits. The case law refers to
this ineligibility generally as imposing harsher or more severe conditions of
confinement. 232 First, noncitizens are automatically ineligible to serve their
terms in a minimum security facility, the lowest security designation for
federal prisons, 233 because BOP policy mandates placement of noncitizens
in low security facilities or higher.234 Congress has directed that the BOP
“shall, to the extent practicable” place a prisoner in a facility that enables
community readjustment, such as a halfway house, for up to one year at the
end of his term. 235 However, because inmates with ICE detainers are
generally ineligible for minimum security facilities, they are ineligible for
this more lenient end-of-sentence confinement.236
Relatedly, noncitizens may serve longer actual prison terms than
otherwise identical citizens. Those who undergo drug treatment in prison
may be entitled to up to one year of early release for successful
completion; 237 however BOP policy renders inmates with ICE detainers

229. Id. at 1481 (“[W]e find it ‘most difficult’ to divorce the penalty from the conviction
in the deportation context.”).
230. See supra notes 195, 209–16 and accompanying text. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) cites a lack of resources as the primary reason that it is unable to remove
each and every convicted, deportable alien. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., DETENTION AND REMOVAL OF ILLEGAL ALIENS OIG-06-33, at 14 (2006).
231. See supra notes 196–97, 206–16 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., United States v. Farouil, 124 F.3d 838, 847 (7th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
233. “Minimum security institutions, also known as Federal Prison Camps (FPCs), have
dormitory housing, a relatively low staff-to-inmate ratio, and limited or no perimeter
fencing. These institutions are work- and program-oriented . . . .” Prison Types & General
Information,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE,
FED.
BUREAU
OF
PRISONS,
http://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/index.jsp (last visited Mar. 23, 2011). On the
other hand, low security facilities “have double-fenced perimeters, mostly dormitory or
cubicle housing, and strong work and program components. The staff-to-inmate ratio in
these institutions is higher than in minimum security facilities.” Id.
234. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT NO.
P5100.08, INMATE SECURITY DESIGNATION AND CUSTODY CLASSIFICATION ch. 5, at 9 (2006).
235. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1) (Supp. 2010).
236. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 651 & n.2.
237. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) (2006); 28 C.F.R. § 550.54(a)(1)(iv) (2010).
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ineligible for early release. 238 Several other categories of inmates are
similarly disqualified, including inmates with convictions for homicide,
rape, arson, or kidnapping; inmates who had previously been released under
the treatment program; and contractual boarders.239
Third, Congress has granted the U.S. Attorney General the authority to
detain a convicted noncitizen at the end of his term of imprisonment.240
Formerly, ICE did not begin deportation proceedings until the conclusion of
a deportable alien’s prison term, but more recently, ICE has made efforts to
begin proceedings earlier and decrease the time noncitizens spend in
immigration detention following the end of their sentences.241 These
efforts have helped, but have not eliminated the likelihood that a deportable
alien may spend several extra months functionally imprisoned, in addition
to the term to which he was sentenced.242 The BOP prohibits crediting
immigration detention toward a prison sentence, 243 but with an easy
analogy to creditable time served,244 courts are left to consider whether the
sentence imposed should account for that time.
The courts’ treatment of the three main ways that alienage impacts
sentences has created a circuit split, as courts have disagreed in their

238. 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(1); see also Nora V. Demleitner, Terms of Imprisonment:
Treating the Noncitizen Offender Equally, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 174, 176 (2009) (arguing
that this program should be expanded to allow noncitizens to participate).
239. 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(2)–(7). Contractual boarders include, for example, state
inmates housed in federal prison. Id. § 550.55(b)(3).
240. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2006) states: “The Attorney General shall take into custody
any alien who . . . is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in
section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) [multiple criminal convictions for crimes involving moral
turpitude], (A)(iii) [aggravated felonies], (B) [controlled substances], (C) [certain firearm
offenses], or (D) [miscellaneous crimes] of this title . . . .” The statute provides a narrow
exception to mandatory confinement where release is necessary to protect a witness in an
investigation. See id. § 1226(c)(2). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
detaining deportable aliens in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003).
241. See Martin Arms, Comment, Judicial Deportation Under 18 USC § 3583(d): A
Partial Solution to Immigration Woes?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 657 & n.26 (1997).
242. See id.; see also Transcript of Public Hearing, supra note 188, at 33–34 (statement of
John T. Morton, Asst. Sec’y of Homeland Sec. for ICE) (noting that a “large number” of
deportable federal inmates spend between forty days to a few months in civil detention
pending deportation). While immigration detention is technically a civil process, the
conditions of detention centers often mirror those of prisons. See Anil Kalhan, Rethinking
Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 43, 47 (2010),
http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/110/42_Anil_Kalhan.pdf
(discussing the severe conditions of immigration detention and the use of county jails to hold
detainees).
243. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT NO.
5880.28, CHANGE NOTICE SENTENCE COMPUTATION MANUAL 1-15A (1997); Demleitner,
supra note 238, at 174.
244. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2006) (giving a person credit toward completion of a sentence
for time served prior to the beginning of the sentence); STEPHEN R. SADY & LYNN
DEFFEBACH, THE SENTENCING COMMISSION, THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, AND THE NEED FOR
FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING AMELIORATIVE STATUTES TO ADDRESS UNWARRANTED
AND
UNAUTHORIZED
OVER-INCARCERATION
25–26
(2008),
available
at
http://or.fd.org/symp2.final%20for%20pdf.pdf (arguing that the BOP’s rule prohibiting
credit for time spent in immigration detention lacks any “conceivable justification”).
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interpretations of how these factors interact with aspects of § 3553 and the
Guidelines’ provisions for departure.
II. CONSIDERING THE CONSEQUENCES OF ALIENAGE IN SENTENCING
The conflict over considering deportability in sentencing revolves around
the three issues outlined in Part I.C. First, courts differ over whether the
deportation itself is, in some circumstances, so onerous that the defendant
deserves a discounted sentence.245 Second, given certain legislative and
administrative policies that govern the rights of incarcerated noncitizens
compared to citizens, judges vary as to whether the resulting harsher
conditions of confinement merit a downward departure for the noncitizen
defendant. 246 Third, because a noncitizen convict may face additional time
in immigration detention following a prison term, a few courts have queried
whether this increased detention warrants an offset.247
This circuit split first emerged in the mid-1990s, under the early period of
the mandatory Guidelines scheme. In 1993, the Second Circuit decided
United States v. Restrepo, 248 holding that while departing downward in
consideration of alienage was not barred per se, the factors that the
defendant presented—likely deportation, more severe prison conditions,
and additional immigration detention—did not suffice to justify a
departure. 249 The Restrepo court thus left very little room for consideration
of alienage consequences because it rejected each of the factors that
defendants typically raise.250 Several circuits explicitly adopted Restrepo’s
logic. 251 The D.C. Circuit, however, diverged from the Restrepo line of
cases. In United States v. Smith, 252 the court held that where a defendant
faces more onerous terms of confinement due strictly to his alienage, that

245. See infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1.
246. See infra Parts II.A.2, II.B.2.
247. See infra Parts II.A.3, II.B.3.
248. 999 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1993).
249. Id. at 643–47.
250. See United States v. Mendoza, 576 F.3d 711, 722 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that
defendant’s deportability and resultant conditions of confinement were “nothing other than []
stock argument[s] that [are] routinely, and increasingly, made to the district courts”);
Restrepo, 999 F.2d at 647 (noting that a “large number” of federal defendants are subject to
deportation); see also Murphy Letter, supra note 18, at 1–5 (describing the differences
between citizens’ and noncitizens’ imprisonment under the categories of “Differential
Conditions of Confinement and Prison Time Served” and “Severe Immigration
Consequences”); cf. United States v. Simalavong, 924 F. Supp. 610, 613 (D. Vt. 1995)
(finding defendant’s circumstances so atypical as to fall into Restrepo’s exception); infra
notes 353–54 and accompanying text.
251. See United States v. Veloza, 83 F.3d 380, 382 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Nnanna, 7 F.3d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 7 F.3d 1483,
1487 (10th Cir. 1993).
252. 27 F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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increase in severity may be offset by a downward departure.253 Essentially,
Smith found sufficient the factors that Restrepo rejected. 254
After 1996, some courts argued that Koon obviated the split, as it
recognized broad discretion for judges to depart downward. 255 Thus,
Booker’s even wider grant of discretion could have eradicated the issue
from the discourse entirely; 256 however, that has not been the case, as the
following sections elucidate. 257
Since Booker made the Guidelines advisory in 2005,258 sentencing courts
have grappled with the proper application of the Guidelines and other
sentencing factors. 259 Following Booker, departures remain available for
courts that find that the consequences of alienage are mitigating factors
taking a case out of the heartland. 260 Additionally, sentencing judges often
see likely future deportation, and its attendant consequences for the
noncitizen prisoner, as accomplishing some of § 3553’s goals, and thus
incarceration is not the only source of punishment,261 incapacitation,262 and
deterrence. 263 Meanwhile, appellate courts review application of the §
3553 factors for reasonableness and—either explicitly or implicitly—must
determine the appropriate level of scrutiny applicable to non-Guidelines
sentences. 264
A. Sentencing Courts Cannot Consider the Effects of Noncitizenship
The Guidelines do not indicate whether alienage and deportability should
play a role in sentencing, and thus since Booker, courts have addressed
253. Id. at 650.
254. See id. at 654–55; see also Susan L. Pilcher, Justice Without a Blindfold: Criminal
Proceedings and the Alien Defendant, 50 ARK. L. REV. 269, 327 & n.253 (1997) (noting that
Smith accepted the “identical argument” that Restrepo rejected).
255. See, e.g., United States v. Garay, 235 F.3d 230, 233 & n.18 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting
abrogation of Nnanna in the wake of Koon); United States v. Farouil, 124 F.3d 838, 847 (7th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Charry Cubillos, 91 F.3d 1342, 1344 (9th Cir. 1996); Jason Bent,
Note, Sentencing Equality for Deportable Aliens: Departures from the Sentencing
Guidelines on the Basis of Alienage, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1320, 1338 (2000); see also Koon v.
United States, 518 U.S. 81, 106–07 (1996); supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
256. See United States v. Gomez, 431 F.3d 818, 825 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“If Booker’s
rendering the Guidelines discretionary means anything, it must give a district judge greater
latitude on these issues [of individual circumstances or hardship] than did Koon.”).
257. See infra Part II.A–B.
258. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (Breyer, J., delivering the
opinion of the Court in part); supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
260. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2010); supra notes 67, 168 and
accompanying text.
261. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2006); United States v. Wills, 476 F.3d 103, 107 (2d
Cir. 2007).
262. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C); United States v. Ngatia, 477 F.3d 496, 502 (7th Cir.
2007).
263. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B); Wills, 476 F.3d at 108.
264. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 313 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part)
(noting the breadth of plausible interpretations of “unreasonableness” review, from assuring
merely procedural compliance to maintaining effectively mandatory Guidelines); supra note
149 and accompanying text.
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whether alienage consequences moot certain sentencing goals. 265 Where
courts have found such arguments unpersuasive, their common underlying
themes include notions of inequality where a reduction in sentence is
premised on alienage alone, 266 and a rejection of applying a mitigating
factor to such a large swath of federal offenders.267
1. Deportability Does Not Justify a Shorter Sentence
In United States v. Wills, 268 the Second Circuit held that deportability is
not, on its face, an appropriate basis for a sentence reduction.269 In Wills,
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York departed
downward on the grounds that first, the defendant faced the additional
punishment of deportation and second, that under § 3553(a), the defendant
posed no threat to the public because he would be deported. 270 The Second
Circuit reversed both of these judgments. 271
Addressing the district court’s assertion that deportation constituted
additional punishment, the Wills court said little to justify its holding, and
instead, relied on its 1993 holding in Restrepo, affirming it in light of
Booker. 272 The Restrepo court had reasoned that deportability was likely
considered by the Commission, given the number of noncitizens in the
federal criminal system. 273 Therefore, deportability would fall within the
heartland as an inappropriate basis for departure. 274 In addition, the
Restrepo court stated that a downward departure is not “rationally . . .
capable of remedying” 275 the problem caused by deportation for two
reasons. First, according to the court, departure does not ease the burdens
of deportation, but only “advances the day when deportation will occur.”276
A downward departure would thus “exacerbate rather than remedy
[deportation’s] harshness.” 277 Second, the Restrepo court was concerned
that a defendant who moves for a downward departure appears to prefer
deportation to additional time in prison, and cannot logically argue that
deportation is the worse of the two alternatives.278
After affirming the Restrepo departure logic, the Wills court evaluated
the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether deportability merited a
variance. 279 First, it addressed the direct issue raised in the lower court:

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

See supra notes 261–63 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 290, 303–08 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 273, 306 and accompanying text.
476 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2007).
Id. at 107.
Id. at 106 (discussing the district court’s disposition).
Id. at 107–09.
Id. at 107 (citing United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir. 1993)).
See Restrepo, 999 F.2d at 647; supra note 16 and accompanying text.
Wills, 476 F.3d at 108.
Restrepo, 999 F.2d at 647.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Wills, 476 F.3d at 107–08.

2158

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

whether deportation itself incapacitated the offender and protected the
public, thereby reducing the need for the sentence to do so.280 The court
determined that a deported offender remained capable of causing harm
within the United States, be it through illegal reentry, border violence, or
drug trafficking. 281 Thus, the court held that without some affirmative,
individualized basis to believe that the public needed no further protection
from Wills, his deportability was not a sufficient basis to decrease his
sentence. 282
Next, the court considered deportability’s interaction with another of
Congress’s sentencing goals: deterrence.283 Relying again on Restrepo, the
court reasoned that because some offenders may prefer deportation over
incarceration, the deterrent character of imprisonment would be weakened
with a downward variance for deportability. 284
The Second Circuit’s rather exacting review of the district court’s
decision seems to stem from two doctrinal bases. First is the precept from
Booker’s remedial opinion that the advisory Guidelines scheme should
reintroduce some degree of individualization into sentencing. 285 The court
noted that deportability and immigration status are not individual
characteristics; rather, they are shared by a significant percentage of
offenders. 286 The second is an implicit notion that reasonableness review
under Booker requires the application of a certain amount of scrutiny to the
district court’s treatment of the § 3553 factors. 287
In United States v. Castro-Rivas, 288 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit relied on its pre-Booker law on Guidelines departures, and
adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning from Wills, to find that considering
deportability among the § 3553(a) factors was legal error.289 In addition,
the Castro-Rivas court expressed that it could not support an outcome
where disparate sentences turned on citizenship status alone. 290
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cited procedural
unreasonableness—rather than the substantive unreasonableness cited by
Wills—to invalidate consideration of alienage consequences in United

280. Id. (accepting, with some apparent skepticism, the assumption that the “public”
referred to in § 3553 was only the American public); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C)
(2006).
281. Wills, 476 F.3d at 108.
282. Id. at 111.
283. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B); Wills, 476 F.3d at 108.
284. Wills, 476 F.3d at 108.
285. See id.; see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264–65 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
delivering the opinion of the Court in part).
286. See Wills, 476 F.3d at 109. In United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008)
(en banc), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit limited this part of the Wills
reasoning. See id. at 191. Relying on Gall and Kimbrough, the Cavera court noted that
district courts may permissibly rely on categorizations that apply to classes of offenders
rather than to individuals. See id.
287. See Wills, 476 F.3d at 105.
288. 254 F. App’x 742 (10th Cir. 2007).
289. Id. at 750.
290. Id. at 752.
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States v. Arroyo Mojica. 291 There, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Washington had departed downward because the Guidelines did
not account for removal’s extraordinary hardship on a person who had spent
his entire life in the United States. 292 The Ninth Circuit reversed. Relying
on pre-Booker case law, it held that deportability was a prohibited ground
for departure where “the possibility of deportation does not speak to the
offender’s character, culpability or history nor to the seriousness of the
offense.” 293 Finding that the sentencing court did not properly “take
account” of the Guidelines as commanded by Booker, the court found
procedural error and remanded for resentencing. 294
2. Courts Cannot Consider More Severe Conditions of Confinement
Circuit courts have relied on equality rationales and separation of power
arguments in holding that it is inappropriate to reduce a sentence to account
for more severe conditions of confinement associated with
noncitizenship. 295 For example, in United States v. Telles-Milton, 296 the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the
defendant’s contention that the sentencing court erred by failing to
recognize its authority to decrease his sentence to account for the conditions
of confinement he would face due to his noncitizen status.297 The TellesMilton court affirmed the sentence in reliance on its pre-Booker holding that
ineligibility for placement in a halfway house cannot justify a downward
departure. 298 The precedent cited, United States v. Veloza, 299 held that the
defendant was not entitled to a downward departure to account for harsher
conditions of confinement. 300 Veloza, in turn, had relied on Restrepo’s
rationale that a court’s attempt to sidestep BOP policy would impinge upon
legislative discretion.301
291. 131 F. App’x 80, 81 (9th Cir. 2005). Arroyo Mojica was decided two months after
and indeed relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker. See id.
292. Id. at 82 (discussing the district court’s decision).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 83 (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
delivering the opinion of the Court in part)).
295. See infra notes 301, 307 and accompanying text.
296. 347 F. App’x 522 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
297. Id. at 523.
298. Id. at 525. Admittedly, the posture of Telles-Milton—where the district judge
sentenced within the Guidelines range and the defendant appealed his sentence’s
reasonableness—may have produced a different outcome than if the district judge had varied
and the government appealed. See supra note 175. The court nonetheless reiterated in clear
terms in dicta that the sentencing consequences of alienage do not form the basis for a
variance. Telles-Milton, 347 F. App’x at 525.
299. 83 F.3d 380 (11th Cir. 1996).
300. Id. at 382.
301. See id.; United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 1993). The Second
Circuit has similarly reaffirmed this portion of the Restrepo holding under the advisory
Guidelines regime. See United States v. Duque, 256 F. App’x 436, 438 (2d Cir. 2007); see
also United States v. Macedo, 406 F.3d 778, 794 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The government is correct
that the district court based its decision on the BOP’s policy which places alien prisoners in
certain facilities.”). Notably, in Macedo, the court relied on Booker with regard to judicial
fact finding, see id. at 787, but conducted de novo review in reversing the district court’s

2160

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

Likewise, in United States v. Babul, 302 the Seventh Circuit rejected the
notion of an “alienage discount” for those who are imprisoned in the United
There, the court relied on the Strasbourg
States voluntarily. 303
Convention, 304 which allows noncitizen prisoners to be transferred to
prisons in their country of citizenship, where those prisoners would get the
benefit of any programs designed to reacclimate citizens. 305 The Seventh
Circuit has referred to similar requests for departures as “stock
argument[s]” that could be made by every deportable alien, 306 and as
“discrimination in reverse.” 307 Though not explicitly stated, it seems that
the Seventh Circuit’s decisions have been motivated by a belief that the
BOP’s regulatory power can properly impact a noncitizen’s sentence
because the fact of noncitizenship makes the disparity a warranted one,
therefore posing no § 3553(a)(6) problem. 308
3. Future Immigration Detention Cannot Be Offset
The likelihood of future immigration detention poses a particular
challenge to judges sentencing deportable aliens because it is easily
analogized to time served, which is often credited.309 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, in United States v. Arevalo-Caballero, 310
affirmed a sentencing court’s decision not to decrease the defendant’s
sentence to account for post-incarceration ICE detention. 311 The district
court indicated that it would be “folly” to speculate about a future
consequence that was not certain to take place.312 Similarly, the Restrepo
court held that an offset is inappropriate because ICE detention could take
place regardless of the criminal punishment and is not properly considered
criminal punishment.313 The Second Circuit has elsewhere distinguished
between past incarceration and speculative future incarceration, holding that

downward departure for alienage consequences, see id. at 794. This highlights the confusion
wrought by the Booker opinions. See supra notes 107–11 and accompanying text.
302. 476 F.3d 498 (7th Cir. 2007).
303. Id. at 502.
304. Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Mar. 21, 1983, 35 U.S.T. 2867
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4100–15).
305. See Babul, 476 F.3d at 502.
306. United States v. Mendoza, 576 F.3d 711, 722 (7th Cir. 2009).
307. United States v. Meza-Urtado, 351 F.3d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 2003).
308. See Mendoza, 576 F.3d at 722 (“Every deportable alien would be ineligible to
participate in certain BOP programs . . . .”); Meza-Urtado, 351 F.3d at 305 (“That the
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has certain programs for citizen-prisoners, but not deportable
aliens, does not make the aliens’ imprisonment substantially more onerous than the
guidelines contemplated in fixing the punishment range for the offense of conviction.”);
supra note 106 and accompanying text.
309. See United States v. Montez-Gaviria, 163 F.3d 697, 702 (2d Cir. 1998); supra note
244 and accompanying text.
310. 365 F. App’x 419 (3d Cir. 2010).
311. Id. at 423 (3d Cir. 2010).
312. See id. (quoting the district judge).
313. United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 646 (2d Cir. 1993).
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potential future incarceration is too uncertain to warrant a downward
departure. 314
B. Sentencing Courts May Consider the Effects of Noncitizenship
Even prior to Booker, sentencing judges were often moved by the
particularly harsh nature of deportation when applied to certain long-term
residents, 315 as well as the inherent unfairness of permitting alienage alone
to create objectively more onerous terms of confinement. 316 Under a
mandatory Guidelines scheme, courts relied on departure analysis, finding
that such consequences took a particular case outside of the heartland to
which the Guidelines apply. 317 Since Booker, § 3553 variances have
provided courts an equally apt basis to account for what they perceived to
be undeserved severity. 318
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has treated Booker’s
grant of increased discretion as the determining factor in considering
alienage consequences. In dicta, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that
in the post-Booker era, the defendant’s immigration status could lead a
sentencing court to two opposite conclusions, one being that potential
deportation and fewer prison opportunities should be a reason for a
downward variance. Conversely, the other conclusion could be that a
person granted the benefit of entry to the country should be subject to an
upward variance for abusing the privilege. In different factual contexts,
either approach is within the discretion of the sentencing court. 319

Recognizing the validity of both sides of the substantive arguments, the
court noted that neither position is off limits under Booker, so an appellate
court could not override the sound judgment of the sentencing court on this
issue. 320 In other words, the nature of appellate review—that is, the amount
of deference the appellate court accords the decision of the district court—
may be determinative of whether consideration of alienage is left to
stand. 321
1. Deportatability May Justify a Shorter Sentence
In United States v. Ngatia, 322 the Seventh Circuit relied on a reduced
need to incapacitate 323 a deportable alien in affirming a variance from the
Guidelines. 324 There, the court found that deportation negated the need for
incarceration to perform a function in protecting the public, stating,
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Montez-Gaviria, 163 F.3d at 702.
See infra notes 332–34 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 342, 346–48 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 332–34, 342, 345, 353–59 and accompanying text.
See infra note 322–30, 359–61 and accompanying text.
United States v. Petrus, 588 F.3d 347, 356 (6th Cir. 2009).
See id.
See id.; supra note 165 and accompanying text.
477 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2007).
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (2006).
Ngatia, 477 F.3d at 502.
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“[c]onsidering that it is almost certain that Ngatia will be deported
following her release, she will be incapacitated from further drug
importation to the United States.” 325 The Seventh Circuit also stressed the
discretion afforded to sentencing judges and the consequent need for only
minimal appellate review. 326 By saying little else on the subject, the
Seventh Circuit seemingly gave considerable deference to the district
court’s analysis of § 3553.
Section 3553(a)’s command to consider a defendant’s characteristics
similarly provides an avenue for considering alienage consequences. 327 In
United States v. Loaiza-Sanchez, 328 the sentencing court found that illegal
presence was an aggravating factor sufficient to justify sentencing the
defendant at a higher point within the Guidelines range. 329 The defendant
appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that
alienage is properly considered as part of the defendant’s “history and
characteristics.” 330
Both pre- and post-Booker, courts have used Guidelines departure
analysis to account for alienage consequences. 331 The Ferreria court found
that loss of family is not adequately accounted for in the Guidelines.332 The
court relied on United States v. Agu, 333 a pre-Restrepo decision where the
sentencing court departed downward for a defendant who, due to his
military service, was entitled to become a citizen but never did, and whose
imminent separation from his wife and child thus constituted mitigating
circumstances warranting a downward departure.334
The argument that deportation is punishment is supported by scholarship
that maintains that the traditional view of deportation as a civil measure is
out of touch with reality and that deportation is a particularly harsh
penalty. 335 Moreover, the common instinct that the sheer cost of
incarceration 336 justifies shorter terms for deportable aliens because the
325. Id.
326. See id. at 501–02.
327. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (requiring sentencing courts to consider “the history and
characteristics of the defendant”).
328. 622 F.3d 939 (8th Cir. 2010).
329. See id. at 940 (referring to the district court’s decision). The district court did not
depart or issue a variance from the Guidelines; rather, it used alienage as a basis for
movement within the Guidelines range. Id.
330. Id. at 942 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006)).
331. See supra notes 99, 168 and accompanying text.
332. See United States v. Ferreria, 239 F. Supp. 2d 849, 857 (E.D. Wis. 2002).
333. 763 F. Supp. 703 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
334. Id. at 704.
335. See Pauw, supra note 221, at 306 (calling removal “an extremely cruel
punishment”).
336. See BUREAU OF PRISONS, FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM PER CAPITA COSTS 1 (2009),
available at http://www.bop.gov/foia/fy09_per_capita_costs.pdf (reporting that in 2009, it
cost an average of $24,751 to incarcerate one person); JOHN SCHMITT ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON.
& POLICY RESEARCH, THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF INCARCERATION 8, 10 (2010) (arguing
that more severe sentencing policy for drug offenses in particular, and not an increase in
crime, explains the drastic rise in rates of U.S. incarceration since the mid-1980s, and noting
that in 2008, incarceration cost state, local, and the federal governments close to $75 billion).
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expenditure seems futile has received some judicial attention, but has not
been found persuasive. 337 At least one state government has taken steps to
incorporate cost into sentencing policy, 338 but the federal Guidelines only
consider cost effectiveness in cases involving the elderly or “seriously
infirm.” 339
2. Courts May Consider More Severe Conditions of Confinement
A decade before Booker, the D.C. Circuit broke away from the Restrepo
pack and held, in United States v. Smith,340 that a sentencing court may
depart downward in anticipation of the harsher conditions of confinement
that a noncitizen faces in prison. 341 The court acknowledged Restrepo but,
relying on a broad definition of “mitigating circumstances” under the
Guidelines, disagreed with Restrepo’s finding that a sentencing court does
not have the discretion to sidestep BOP policies.342 Notably, the dissenting
judge in Smith argued that the Smith majority imposed an overly
individualized sentence, inconsistent with the dictates of the SRA and the
then-mandatory Guidelines. 343
Several courts have followed the primary Smith holding, allowing
departures where conditions are such that they punish beyond the level that
the Commission contemplated. Generally, these courts seem to grapple
with what constitutes an unwarranted disparity, 344 and often, when they
determine that alienage is the sole cause of a difference in sentence, they
depart or issue a variance. The Seventh Circuit in United States v.
Guzman 345 permitted a departure to account for unduly arduous conditions
of confinement, noting that those conditions may be outside the Guidelines’
contemplation, but not for deportability, rejecting the notion that it
constitutes “double punishment.” 346 Similarly, in United States v. PachecoSoto, 347 decided just after Booker, the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Mexico characterized a noncitizen inmate’s ineligibility for early
release, lack of access to a minimum security facility, and lack of lenience
337. See United States v. Loaiza-Sanchez, 622 F.3d 939, 942 (8th Cir. 2010) (Bright, J.,
dissenting) (“[L]ong sentences for illegal aliens punish not only the defendant but the
American taxpayer. ‘It would be more sensible to give . . . a stiff, but shorter sentence and
then to promptly deport him . . . .’” (quoting United States v. Chavez, 230 F.3d 1089, 1092
(8th Cir. 2000) (Bright, J., concurring))); United States v. Maldonado, 242 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.
2001) (referencing a statement by the district court that “the real reason I’m going to depart
downward here is because I don’t want the taxpayers to pay for him unnecessarily”).
338. See Monica Davey, Touching Off Debate, Missouri Tells Judges Cost of Sentences,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010, at A1.
339. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.1, 5H1.4 (2010).
340. 27 F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
341. See id. at 653–55; U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (permitting departures from the Guidelines
where mitigating or aggravating circumstances exist).
342. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 654; cf. United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 645–46 (2d
Cir. 1993).
343. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 656 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
344. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text.
345. 236 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2001).
346. Id. at 834.
347. 386 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (D.N.M. 2005).
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for participation in drug treatment as “severe and unfair” and found that
those factors formed a sufficient basis to justify a downward departure.348
In United States v. Bautista, 349 the Seventh Circuit permitted departure
where the defendant, a resident alien, faced deportation to Peru where he
had no friends and his only family was his abusive father. 350 The court
reasoned around the logical inconsistencies that had troubled the Restrepo
court, arguing that “the apparent paradox [that departure merely hastens
deportation] disappears if one views the departure not as remedying the
consequences of deportation, but as an offset to those consequences.”351
The court further noted that “nothing in the Guidelines . . . forbids
consideration of extralegal consequences that follow a sentence as grounds
for a departure.” 352
Relying on Smith, two district courts have found that where alien status
alone leads to a substantial increase in the severity of a sentence, departure
is appropriate. The U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont in
United States v. Simalavong 353 held that where Canadian citizenship was
the only reason a defendant would be incarcerated, the case fell outside of
Restrepo’s general prohibition because of how exceptional the particular
hardship was. 354 There, the defendant’s offense score subjected him to
probation and community confinement; as a noncitizen, he was ineligible
for that form of punishment, and his conviction thus mandated
imprisonment. 355 The sentencing court found that where alienage alone
made the difference between an incarceratory and a non-incarceratory
sentence, the case fell outside the heartland, and departed downward in
order to impose the sentence that it would have imposed on a citizen.356
Similarly, in United States v. Bakeas, 357 the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts departed downward where, if the defendant were
a citizen, he would have served his sentence in a minimum security prison
camp, but as a noncitizen was ineligible for placement in that more lenient
type of facility. 358 The court noted that a “downward departure [can be]
appropriate when a defendant’s non-citizenship is more than collateral to
his sentence but instead threatens to change the nature of the entire
sentence.” 359 The court also found that § 3553(a)’s instruction to consider

348. Id. at 1205; see also United States v. Jiang, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1157 (D.N.M.
2005) (stating, without indicating its rationale, that the court may consider deportation in
issuing a variance).
349. 258 F.3d 602 (7th Cir. 2001).
350. Id. at 604–05.
351. Id. at 606.
352. Id.
353. 924 F. Supp. 610 (D. Vt. 1995).
354. Id. at 613 (distinguishing the court’s decision from the general rule of Restrepo).
355. Id. at 611; see supra note 233 and accompanying text.
356. See Simalavong, 924 F. Supp. at 613.
357. 987 F. Supp. 44 (D. Mass. 1997).
358. See id. at 44 (sentencing the defendant to the “functional equivalent” of the sentence
a U.S. citizen would have received).
359. Id. at 48.
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the “kinds of sentences available” 360 required it to consider conditions of
confinement. 361
According to the D.C. Circuit, departure to evade harsher conditions does
not infringe impermissibly upon BOP discretion. 362 The Smith court
reasoned that generally, it will be difficult to determine which factors
impact placement given the BOP’s “almost illimitable” discretion. 363 In
some cases, however, the court was concerned that the restrictions on
noncitizens were imposed strictly as a proxy for flight risk—in other words,
that alienage alone creates the increased severity—and a downward
departure may be appropriate.364
3. The Guidelines Do Not Forbid Accounting for Future, Related
Incarceration
Applying broad deference to the district court’s sentencing decisions, a
Seventh Circuit panel in United States v. Arowosaye 365 found that the
silence in the Guidelines was sufficient to permit a downward departure
where a defendant faced likely incarceration upon being deported to
Nigeria. 366 The court found that because the Guidelines do not prohibit
consideration of future detention, the sentencing court had the discretion to
account for it with a downward departure. 367 The Arowosaye court left the
decision of whether to account for speculative detention to the district
court’s discretion. 368
III. INTERPRETING BOOKER AND ITS PROGENY TO CREATE A MORE
COMPASSIONATE SENTENCING REGIME
Throughout the Guidelines’ history, courts have disagreed over whether
alienage can form the basis for a downward departure under section 5K2.0
or a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553. This Note argues that the Supreme
Court’s post-Booker line of cases indicates that district courts have the
discretion to consider the consequences of alienage in crafting a sentence.
Furthermore, this Note encourages the Commission to incorporate
consideration of alienage consequences into the Guidelines to promote the
SRA’s goal of increased uniformity in sentences.
Part III.A of this Note addresses Booker’s conflicting commands on
appellate review of sentencing decisions, arguing that the Supreme Court’s
360. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3) (2006).
361. Bakeas, 987 F. Supp. at 49.
362. See United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1994). But see United States
v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that a court’s attempt to cure its
disagreement with BOP policy would overstep the judicial role).
363. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 655.
364. See id.
365. 112 F. App’x 528 (7th Cir. 2004).
366. Id. at 532.
367. Id. at 532; see also Symposium, supra note 52, at 9–10 (statement of Hon. Nancy
Gertner) (suggesting that a person who has spent several months in immigration detention
may deserve a downward departure to account for that time served “essentially in custody”).
368. See Arowosaye, 112 F. App’x at 533.
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Guidelines jurisprudence trends toward greater district court discretion and
less scrutinizing appellate review, which is at odds with Congress’s
sentencing goals as expressed in the SRA. Part III.B argues that as a result
of this tension, the Commission should adopt a recommendation within the
Guidelines that allows district judges to consider the consequences of
noncitizenship in sentencing. Placing a recommendation squarely within
the Guidelines would obviate Congress’s concerns about excessive judicial
discretion, increase sentencing uniformity, and be consistent with both
Padilla v. Kentucky and recent Guidelines amendments. Part III.C
recommends a path for consideration of alienage consequences under
§ 3553(a) in the absence of a specific Guideline.
A. The Goals of the SRA and the Supreme Court’s Post-Booker
Jurisprudence Are Irreconcilable
For all the uncertainty about what the SRA and the Guidelines intend to
promote, 369 no doubt exists that they sought to increase consistency and
decrease disparities in sentencing. 370 To accomplish these goals, Congress
restricted judicial discretion, 371 which arguably existed in excess prior to
the enactment of the SRA,372 and replaced it with a mandatory model for
arriving at a sentence. After Booker, the model remains, but judicial
discretion has been reintroduced into the sentencing process.373 The postBooker trajectory indicates that the Court is struggling to maintain Booker’s
It recognizes that Booker’s merits opinion gave
two holdings. 374
sentencing judges very broad discretion, 375 but the remedy curbed that
discretion with appellate review in order to promote uniformity, adhere to
Congress’s sentencing goals, 376 and maintain the continuing validity of the
Guidelines.
This irreconcilability is reflected in the different ways that circuit courts
have treated lower court decisions considering alienage in sentencing.377
The difference among the circuit courts that find that immigration
consequences may not be considered 378 and those that find that they may379
seems to rest fundamentally upon conflicting visions of the role of appellate
review under Booker. 380
Booker espouses two primary schools of thought on the nature of
appellate review.381 The merits opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, holds
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

See supra notes 41–49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.
See infra notes 382–90 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 382–85, 388–90 and accompanying text.
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that judicial fact-finding that leads to an increase in sentencing range is
impermissible under the Sixth Amendment. 382 An outgrowth of this
holding is that searching appellate review would make the Guidelines more
persuasive by pressuring a judge to sentence within the Guidelines. 383 The
constraint of appellate review thus calls into question the constitutionality
of substantive appellate sentencing review.384 In other words, Justice
Stevens’s opinion countenances very limited appellate review of
sentencing, deferring instead to the district court’s discretion to properly
balance factors. 385
On the other hand, Justice Breyer’s remedial opinion makes the
Guidelines advisory rather than wholly voluntary. 386 The Guidelines
calculation is a required consideration and first step in the sentencing
process. 387 The remedial opinion stresses the uniformity Congress sought
in passing the SRA388 and thus requires the use of reasonableness review to
maintain that uniformity. 389 Under the remedial holding, the § 3553(a)
factors must form a basis for appellate review. 390
While from a pragmatic point of view it may be plausible to carve out a
middle road that reconciles these two holdings,391 from a doctrinal
standpoint, they are arguably incompatible.392 In its post-Booker holdings,
the Court has generally—though not consistently 393—recognized and
deferred to the primacy of judicial discretion in sentencing. 394 Since
Booker, the Court has held that a district court level presumption that the
Guidelines are reasonable 395 and appellate requirements of
proportionality 396 in variances do not comport with the advisory Guidelines
scheme. In these decisions, the Court returned a significant amount of
discretion to sentencing judges. 397

382. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
383. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005) (Breyer, J., delivering the
opinion of the Court in part) (noting that more scrutinizing de novo review under the
PROTECT Act made the Guidelines “more mandatory”).
384. See Shapiro & Seltzer, supra note 175, at 177.
385. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 311–12 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
386. See id. at 245 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part).
387. See supra notes 98, 167 and accompanying text.
388. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 253 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part).
389. See supra note 141–43 and accompanying text.
390. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
391. See Richard G. Kopf, The Top Ten Things I Learned from Apprendi, Blakely,
Booker, Rita, Kimbrough and Gall, OSJCL AMICI: VIEWS FROM THE FIELD 1, 1 (Jan. 2008),
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/osjcl/blog/Articles_1/kopf-final-12-28-07.pdf (comparing Justice
Ginsburg’s signing onto both Booker opinions to Orwellian “Doublethink,” or “the power of
holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of
them”).
392. See supra notes 111, 171 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 133, 152 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 125–26, 128, 148 and accompanying text.
395. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
396. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 115–28 and accompanying text.
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Judicial discretion, however, is precisely what Congress sought to limit
in passing the SRA. 398 Judicial discretion is, in some ways, in conflict with
Congress’s explicit goal of increased uniformity. 399 These conflicting
directives for appellate review under § 3553 underlie the circuit split this
Note addresses, wherein some courts of appeals reverse a lower court’s
consideration of alienage consequences while others permit them to
stand. 400 The trend in the Supreme Court’s sentencing jurisprudence since
2005 reveals that it currently prefers the more permissive model. 401 In
other words, as it is within the district court’s discretion to determine when
alienage consequences should impact a sentence, those circuits that deferred
to a district judge’s finding that alienage consequences may merit a
variance 402 seem to better comply with the Supreme Court’s post-Booker
pronouncements.
The risk to judges, however, is that if Congress senses an unsavory return
to the pre-SRA level of discretion and disparity, it may respond with
constitutional sentencing reforms that remove discretion once again.403 As
the experience with the Feeney Amendment demonstrated, federal judges
bristle at the removal of discretion if it makes them feel that their hands are
tied to mete out unjust, if legal, sentences. 404 Accordingly, this Note
advocates relying on more than judicial discretion to take account of
alienage consequences.
B. The Guidelines Should Recognize Deportability as a Basis for
Downward Departures
Although courts can account for alienage consequences through the
exercise of judicial discretion, amending the Guidelines to account for those
consequences would be a superior way to administer these factors, as it
would better comply with the goals of the SRA405 and the dictates of
Booker. 406 A Guidelines amendment would provide a more systematic
398. See supra notes 30–36 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 33, 142–55 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 285–87, 319–20, 326 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 115–34 and accompanying text; see also Lynch, supra note 142, at 4
(arguing that Kimbrough indicates that the Court has trended toward interpreting Booker to
provide more sentencing court discretion).
402. See supra Part II.B.
403. See Berman, supra note 93, at 357 (discussing former Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales’s proposal to respond to Booker with mandatory minimum guidelines); Kate Stith,
The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE
L.J. 1420, 1495–96 & n.329 (2008) (discussing the possibility that Congress could modify
the structure of mandatory minimums to rein in judicial sentencing discretion); see also
JUDGES’ SURVEY, supra note 107, tbl.16 (finding that 33% of district court judges believe
that mandatory minimums are the leading cause of disparities in sentencing, whereas only
11% think that judicial discretion is the primary cause); supra notes 87–89 and
accompanying text.
404. See supra note 89.
405. See Berman, supra note 93, at 376 (arguing that the Commission—not Congress or
the courts—is the body best suited to make changes to sentencing practice); supra notes 33–
46 and accompanying text.
406. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
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methodology for district courts to factor in alienage, and would help resolve
the circuit split created by spotty treatment of such factors under § 3553.
While a Guidelines provision would not bind any judge, it would have
two decisive advantages over the current method of relying on § 3553.
First, it could provide judges with a suggested points value for
deportability, thereby encouraging uniformity in the size of any offset.407
Second, it would permit the offset to occur within the Guidelines
calculation, rather than outside of it, which would subject it to less
searching appellate review. 408
Empirical evidence suggests that the judiciary would support an alienage
amendment. In a 2010 survey of district court judges, 62% of judges
indicated that family ties and responsibilities are a relevant consideration in
a departure or variance, and 49% indicated that community ties are
relevant. 409 Only 2% and 5% of judges thought that those considerations
were never relevant, respectively. 410 Those two qualities—family and
community ties—approximate what deportability accounts for,411 because
they are precisely what is lost to a deported alien who has built a life in the
United States. 412
An amendment would also be consistent with the recent Guidelines
changes that recognize the particular burdens on noncitizens. 413 The
cultural assimilation amendment specifically addresses the hardship that
deportation exacts on those with significant family and community ties.414
The amendment to the Guidelines that sanctioned fast track departures, and
the proposed amendment for stipulation to deportation, speak primarily to
the resources saved when a criminal alien cooperates with his removal,415
rather than on the inherent fairness of his sentence. Nonetheless, these
changes indicate, at the very least, that the Commission is willing to take
notice of deportability in sentencing, and that at minimum, some situations
407. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K3.1 (2010) (authorizing a
departure of as many as four points for fast track programs); see also Letter from Carissa
Byrne Hessick, Assoc. Professor, Sandra Day O’Connor Coll. of Law, Ariz. State Univ., to
U.S.
Sentencing
Comm’n
1
(Mar.
17,
2010),
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20100317/ASU.pdf
(encouraging the Commission to amend the Guidelines to include a factor that is already
taken into account under § 3553(a) analysis to promote uniformity).
408. See supra notes 117, 173–75 and accompanying text.
409. JUDGES’ SURVEY, supra note 107, tbl.13.
410. Id.
411. See Cynthia Hujar Orr, Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Lawyers, Statement Before the
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 3 (Mar. 17, 2010) (arguing that a downward departure for
consequences of alienage would be consistent with U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6, which directs
sentencing courts to look at an offender’s family ties and responsibilities); supra notes 183–
84 and accompanying text.
412. See supra notes 332–34 and accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 182–89 and accompanying text.
414. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. Of course, a fundamental difference
between the cultural assimilation amendment and this discussion is that the amendment
provides a departure where community ties were the motivation for the crime, whereas here
such a loss is a consequence of the crime.
415. See supra notes 91, 186–89 and accompanying text.

2170

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

counsel a shorter sentence because of it. They also suggest that the legal
fiction that deportation is not punitive is not an obstacle to considering
deportation at sentencing.
Padilla v. Kentucky partially dismantled a significant doctrinal obstacle
to considering deportability in sentencing. While Restrepo and the cases
that followed it relied on the formalism that deportation is separate from
criminal punishment, 416 Padilla states that, to the contrary, immigration
consequences are not only properly considered at the sentencing stage, but
must be considered to satisfy a defendant’s right to effective counsel.417 To
be sure, this Note contemplates a broad reading of Padilla, which only dealt
with state, not federal, sentencing. While Padilla did not go so far as to
reject outright the notion that deportation is not criminal punishment, it
unquestionably anticipates the serious impact that deportation can have on a
defendant, and seems to poke holes in the legal fiction that deportation is
not punishment. 418 Given other admissions of the Supreme Court to the
effect that deportation can be so severe as to constitute punishment,419
arguing to the contrary envisages an uphill battle.
Undeniably, there are counterarguments that this solution must confront.
The most salient challenge is that it is unfair to give a noncitizen a shorter
sentence than a citizen who has committed the same crime, 420 and that
considering these consequences actually creates a sentencing disparity.421
That argument is circular because it assumes that immigration
consequences do not contribute to the punishment imposed.
A corollary to this argument is that there is something unfair about
shortening the sentence of a person who, in addition to committing a crime,
has concomitantly violated the terms of his immigration status.422
However, in the case of a legal resident at sentencing, something is also
being taken away from that person that is not taken away from an otherwise
identical citizen, namely his earned privilege of being in the United States
and his ability to return to his family at the end of his prison term. 423 Some
may argue that it is inappropriate to shorten a sentence simply to offset the
application of U.S. law. 424 What this Note proposes, however, is not very
different from what Kimbrough allowed—permitting the sentencing court
to recognize when a penalty that the law imposes is simply too harsh to be
reconciled with § 3553(a). 425
416. See supra notes 218–22 and accompanying text.
417. See supra notes 227–29 and accompanying text.
418. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (“Although removal
proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is nevertheless intimately related to the criminal
process.” (citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984))).
419. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
420. See supra notes 303–08 and accompanying text.
421. See supra notes 106, 180 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 307, 319 and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 198, 221 and accompanying text.
424. See, e.g., United States v. Wills, 476 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]reating the
mere application of immigration law as the basis for a non-Guidelines sentence . . . flouts the
goal of individualized justice . . . .”).
425. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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This Note does not advocate for an automatic downward departure for
deportability 426 such that every noncitizen defendant would get a shorter
sentence than a similarly situated U.S. citizen. 427 Rather, this Note argues
that defendants who demonstrably suffer a harsher penalty because of their
alienage status are entitled to have that consequence considered. A sizeable
percentage of federal offenders may face these consequences, 428 and thus it
behooves the criminal justice system to devise a consistent and uniform
way to address those consequences, rather than adhering to the haphazard
method that currently exists. 429
C. Deportable Offenders Can Be Granted Relief Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553
In the absence of modification to the Guidelines, courts are nonetheless
permitted to account for alienage consequences. Two provisions of the
SRA indicate that alienage consequences should be considered at
sentencing. First, the SRA obliges sentencing judges to consider the
“history and characteristics of the defendant.” 430 That requirement puts
alienage directly before the sentencing judge.431 As the Eighth Circuit has
noted, alienage and the consequences of deportation fit squarely into that
statute, and as such, courts are obligated to consider them. 432 Likewise,
deportation can be “the most important part” of the criminal sanction for a
defendant 433 and therefore, should be taken into consideration among the
defendant’s other relevant characteristics. The difference between the preBooker mandatory Guidelines and the post-Booker advisory Guidelines is
the change in primary focus from the Guidelines calculation to the dictates
of § 3553, and, as one district judge has stated, unlike the Guidelines,
§ 3553 “allows judges to consider everything that is important in sentencing
a defendant.” 434
Further, the parsimony principal that restrains every sentence, demanding
sentences that are “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to accomplish
the goals of punishment, 435 counsels toward considering alienage
consequences insofar as they impose additional punishment. Following
Padilla, 436 if immigration consequences are properly considered at
sentencing, then arguably they are properly considered in the calculus of
what constitutes sufficient, but not greater than necessary punishment.

426. Such a proposal may, however, be permissible under some courts’ interpretations of
Kimbrough. See supra note 126.
427. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
428. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
429. See supra Part II.
430. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006).
431. See Lynch, supra note 142, at 6 (“But whatever guidelines do not capture—and the
Guidelines capture almost nothing about individual character and circumstances—must be
the preserve of [the sentencing judge’s] discretion.”).
432. See supra notes 328–30 and accompanying text.
433. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010).
434. Symposium, supra note 52, at 4 (statement of Hon. Lynn Adelman).
435. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 226–29 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, when a defendant can show that deportation, lack of access to
prison benefits, and prolonged immigration detention will increase the
severity of his sentence, § 3553 requires offsetting those factors to avoid
violating the parsimony principal.
CONCLUSION
Every year, thousands of noncitizens face terms of incarceration that are
qualitatively different than the prison terms served by similarly situated
U.S. citizens. Conflicting views on how properly to punish those
confronting these penalties undermine Congress’s objective of uniformity
in sentencing. The failure to take account of alienage consequences creates
needlessly burdensome sentences for a sizeable group of people in violation
of the statutory requirement that parsimony guide federal sentencing.
Sentencing courts can and should take deportability and its attendant
consequences into account in crafting a sentence, upon a finding that
demonstrably more severe punishment is the result of those consequences.
However, rather than promote reliance solely upon the broad dictates of
§ 3553, the Commission should explicitly recognize alienage consequences
as a proper basis for a sentence reduction because the Commission’s
imprimatur would increase uniformity, satisfying Congress’s policy aims.
Likewise, accounting for alienage consequences within the initial
Guidelines calculation makes that consideration subject to less searching
appellate scrutiny, consistent with Booker’s return of discretion to the
sentencing judge.

